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Imagining a Progressive and 
Comprehensive Consumption Tax 
f you love those who love you, what reward do you 
have?  Do not even the tax collectors do the same?”1  
Tax collection is no stranger to enmity.2  Tax systems plagued by 
corruption, extortion, and the imposition of exorbitant rates 
could explain this historic unpopularity.  But one would have a 
difficult time establishing that any of those problems exist within 
the American income tax system.  Yet, Americans continue to 
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1 Matthew 5:46. 
2 If nothing else, the Biblical references are evidence of an historic loathing for 
tax collection: 
[A]s [Jesus] sat at dinner in the house, many tax collectors and sinners 
came and were sitting with him and his disciples.  When the Pharisees saw 
this, they said to his disciples, “Why does your teacher eat with tax 
collectors and sinners?”  But when he heard this, he said, “Those who are 
well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick.  Go and learn 
what this means, ‘I desire mercy, not sacrifice.’  For I have come to call not 
the righteous but sinners.” 
Matthew 9:10–13; Mark 2:13–17; Luke 5:27–32.  See also Matthew 21:31–32; Mark 
3:15.  Calumniations notwithstanding, in perhaps one of the more famous passages 
of the New Testament, Jesus diplomatically instructs his followers to pay their taxes 
nonetheless:  “Give . . . to [Caesar] the things that are [Caesar’s], and to God the 
things that are God’s.”  Matthew 22:21; Mark 12:13–17; Luke 20:20–26. 
“I
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loathe tax collection3 and the question is whether they have a 
compelling reason to do so. 
A fight over money is not the sole cause of the odiousness of 
the American income tax system.  Of course, most taxpayers 
believe the income tax system asks too much of them4 for what 
they get in return.5  But, while taxpayers understandably are 
hesitant about paying more taxes,6 the greater problem with the 
income tax system is not the tax itself; it is how the tax is 
collected.  Indeed, taxpayers overwhelmingly agree that the 
income tax collection mechanism is far too complicated to 
understand and implement.7 
 
3 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns:  A Fresh Start for the U.S. 
Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 272 (2002) (“From the period immediately 
following World War II until 1972, the American people viewed the income tax as 
the fairest tax in the nation.  Since 1980, they have consistently viewed it as the least 
fair.”) (citation omitted). 
4 According to the Tax Foundation’s 2006 Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on 
Tax and Wealth, 59 percent of those surveyed believed that the amount of federal 
income tax they pay is “too high.”  HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 
OF U.S. ATTITUDES ON TAX AND WEALTH–TOP LINE RESULTS 1 (created for 
Tax Found., Wash. D.C., Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 SURVEY], available at 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/survey_topline-20060405.pdf.  This figure rose 4 
percent from the prior year.  Id.; see also Andrew Chamberlain & Scott A. Hodge, 
2006 Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Tax and Wealth, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 141 
(Tax Found., Wash. D.C.), Apr. 2006, at 6–7 (reporting and interpreting the 2006 
survey results). 
5 In the 2006 Tax Foundation survey, 65 percent of those surveyed believed that 
the personal value they receive from paying taxes is only fair or poor; 24 percent of 
those surveyed believed the value received was “pretty good”; while only 2 percent 
considered it “excellent.”  2006 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 1. 
6 According to the 2005 Tax Foundation survey U.S. Attitudes on Taxes and 
Wealth, 64 percent of those surveyed believed the government should decrease 
services and taxes or keep taxes and services the same.  HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 
ATTITUDES ON TAX AND WEALTH ISSUES–TOPLINE RESULTS 3 (created for Tax 
Found., Wash. D.C., Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 SURVEY] available at 
http://taxfoundation.org/files/topline-20050401.pdf.  Only 13 percent of those 
surveyed believed the government should increase services and raise taxes.  Id.  
Moreover, in the 2006 survey, 79 percent indicated they would not be willing to pay 
an additional $2470 in federal taxes to eliminate the deficit and 63 percent believed, 
if forced to pay the additional $2470, Congress would mostly increase spending and 
not pay off part of the deficit.  2006 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 4.  Twenty percent 
believed Congress would pay off part of the debt but increase spending nonetheless.  
Id. 
7 In the 2006 Tax Foundation Annual Survey, 80 percent of those surveyed found 
the current federal income tax either very complicated or somewhat complicated.  
2006 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 3.  Only 9 percent of those surveyed believed the 
system was “not too complex” and only 1 percent found it “not complex at all.”  Id.  
Many scholars also believe the income tax is unnecessarily complicated. 
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Taxpayers are unhappy because the method of collection 
under the American income tax system places the filing burden 
on them.8  The tax-filing burden is arguably unfair9 and almost 
certainly unwise.10  Admittedly, if no other practical means of 
securing governmental revenue existed, perhaps requiring 
individuals to calculate and file their own taxes, and face the 
accompanying responsibilities and penalties, would be 
reasonable burdens.  But there are alternatives. 
This Article proposes the graduated consumption tax model11 
as a practical alternative to remove the tax-filing burden from 
the individual taxpayer while progressively generating 
comparable revenue amounts.12  The graduated consumption tax 
 
Studies of the federal income tax code consistently find that the current 
system is excessively complex.  This study concurs, quantifying the code’s 
complexity in a way that makes clear how unnecessary much of it is.  If the 
high cost of complying with the federal income tax were a necessary price 
to pay for a fair and effective tax system, there would be little room for 
complaint.  But in fact, most complaints are justified. 
J. Scott Moody et al., The Rising Cost of Complying with the Federal Income Tax, 
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 138 (Tax Found., Wash. D.C.), Dec. 2005, at 2. 
8 The 2005 Tax Foundation Annual Survey found 70 percent of those surveyed 
either disliked or hated working on their income taxes.  2005 SURVEY, supra note 6, 
at 6. 
9 Some taxpayers have gone so far as to attack the income tax as a form of 
involuntary servitude.  Courts have rejected such claims.  See, e.g., Kasey v. Comm’r 
of Internal Revenue, 457 F.2d 369, 370 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a claim that the 
income tax filing burden amounted to involuntary servitude had “no merit”); 
Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding a claim that the 
income tax violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary 
servitude was “far-fetched”); LaRue v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 957, 959 (C.D. 
Ill. 1997) (finding plaintiff’s unsupported claim that the income tax violated the 
Thirteenth Amendment was “absurd”); Trohimovich v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 
869 P.2d 95, 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“Trohimovich also claims that the payment 
of taxes is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery.  He is 
wrong.  Payment of taxes does not constitute a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment against involuntary servitude.”). 
10 Filing burdens have reached unhealthy levels.  And, while the advent of e-filing 
may relieve some of the burden, it does not eliminate the burden entirely.  See Mary 
Dalrymple, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, GE Files Tax Return That’s 24,000 Pages:  
Would Have Been Eight Feet Tall, June 1, 2006, at BU4 (“[General Electric] filed a 
24,000-page tax return to the Internal Revenue Service this month.  If it were paper, 
it would stack up 8 feet high.  But instead of sending boxes to the tax collectors, GE 
filed its return electronically–all 237 megabytes of it.”). 
11 The graduated consumption tax model is debuted in this Article as the 
offspring of the author’s imagination. 
12 While focusing principally on tax policy, this Article is largely, if not entirely, 
heuristic.  This Article is an unrestrained experiment in thought; it is not intended 
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model imposes differential tax rates on the consumption of all 
goods and services, both at the production and retail levels.  The 
rate attached to each good or service would depend on the 
item’s character–whether it is a “necessity” or a “luxury.”  The 
items characterized as most necessary would be assessed at the 
lowest tax rates while those characterized as most luxurious 
would be assessed at the highest.  All other consumables would 
be taxed at a rate somewhere in between. 
This Article consists of six parts.  The first part introduces and 
outlines the graduated consumption tax proposal.  Part II 
explores the major proposed alternatives to the income tax, 
including some of the leading scholarship, and compares some of 
the major features of these models against the graduated 
consumption tax.  This section is not intended to serve as an 
exhaustive analysis or critique of the alternative tax models.  
Rather, it illustrates the major shortcomings of alternatives that 
ultimately fail either to free the individual taxpayer from the 
burden of tax collection or to generate progressively sufficient 
revenue, or both. 
Part III provides an illustrative model of the graduated 
consumption tax system and its underlying theory.  Based on an 
expansion of Hobbesian foundational tax theory, the illustrative 
model provides a six-tiered graduation ranging from items of 
“Fundamental Necessity” to items of “Consummate Luxury.”  
Each tier is assigned a specific number of internal steps assessed 
incrementally at progressive tax rates.  Characterization of items 
placed within each tier would be determined as objectively as 
possible, employing a ranking system based on different 
quantitative and qualitative factors. 
Part IV identifies and examines the potential benefits of the 
graduated consumption tax model, including greater perception 
of fairness; the encouragement of responsible spending and 
savings; greater taxpayer participation; decreased tax evasion 
and avoidance; greater capital surplus; and lower interest rates.  
 
to be quantitative, technical proof of the truth of its arguments or assumptions.  
Admittedly, the graduated consumption tax model raises far more pragmatic 
questions and concerns than it answers.  But there is a method to the madness.  By 
approaching these questions from an outsider’s perspective, this Article offers a 
radical alternative to force an honest evaluation of the shortcomings of the present 
income tax system, the circumstances where the proposed alternative could work, 
and the policies that could inspire the replacement of the income tax or the 
enactment of meaningful change. 
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Conversely, Part V identifies and examines potential 
weaknesses, including the theoretical and factual problems 
inherent with item characterization, as well as concerns with the 
model’s potential administration, equity, and economic 
efficiency.  This part concludes that each of these concerns must 
be tested successfully before implementation of the model 
becomes possible. 
Part VI considers briefly the constitutional implications of 
replacing the existing income tax system with a graduated 
consumption tax model.  Although there may be some direct tax 
implications related to possible transition relief, this part 
concludes that the graduated consumption tax would be 
constitutional because essentially it is a classic indirect sales tax.  
Finally, the Article concludes by calling for the political will to 
change a broken system. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX 
PROPOSAL 
The graduated consumption tax imposes differential tax rates 
on the consumption of all goods and services at the production 
and retail levels.  Although the graduated consumption tax is 
designed primarily to relieve the individual taxpayer’s filing 
burdens, the model also addresses the three legs of traditional 
tax policy: administrative efficiency, equity, and economic 
efficiency.  First, administrative efficiency is attained because a 
tax on consumption would relieve the filing burden from the 
individual taxpayer.  Second, equity is preserved because 
differential rates would avoid regressivity.  Finally, economic 
efficiency is achieved because the comprehensive tax base would 
ensure the generation of revenue amounts comparable to the 
income tax system. 
Proposing an income tax alternative is nothing new.  In fact, 
numerous alternative tax models, some of which are quite 
popular, already exist.13  Yet, none proposes to remove the 
taxpayer’s filing burden while progressively generating tax 
revenue in amounts comparable to the present income tax 
system.  The graduated consumption tax model is the only 
 
13 See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
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alternative to propose taxing, at multiple or differential tax rates, 
consumption at the production and retail levels. 
Although other models disfavor the use of differential tax 
rates,14 multiple rates are at the heart of the graduated 
consumption tax model.  While more administratively 
complicated than the single-rate alternatives, differential tax 
rates are necessary for the graduated consumption tax model to 
free individual taxpayers from the burdens of tax filing, while 
simultaneously preserving tax progressivity.15 
Under the graduated consumption tax model, the differential 
tax rates vary according to the degree of necessity or luxury of 
the item consumed.  The less necessary–or more luxurious–an 
item is, the higher the rate of tax on that item.16  The various tax 
rates would be compiled in an index of tax schedules separating 
consumables into different categories based on their degree of 
necessity or luxury.  The rate represented in the schedule would 
not be a fixed dollar amount but a percentage attached to the 
price of the item at purchase.17 
Determining the character, or degree of necessity or luxury of 
a given item, would be a difficult task requiring value 
judgment.18  Accurate characterization would be fundamental to 
the fair application of a graduated consumption tax.19  Accurate 
characterization would require an objective examination of a 
 
14 See, e.g., infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
15 The graduated consumption tax model is designed to achieve three purposes:  
(1) to remove individual taxpayer filing burdens, (2) to preserve tax progressivity, 
and (3) to generate sufficient amounts of revenue at reasonable tax rates.  
Incidentally, the author believes a “fair” tax is defined by these three principles.  Cf. 
infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
16 Since the price of an item may vary by state or seller, the degree of necessity or 
luxury ascribed to an item should not be purely a function of the market price of an 
item, but a function of a number of different factors taken together.  See infra note 
20 and accompanying text. 
17 This method makes the graduated consumption tax uniformly applicable 
nationwide, regardless of the possible variation in price of an item sold in two or 
more states.  Since the tax would be a percentage of the final purchase price, the 
same proportionate rate of tax would apply. 
18 Establishing an administrative agency competent to make transparently 
objective determinations as to product character is a vital component of the 
graduated consumption tax model. 
19 Legitimacy of the characterization process depends primarily on objectivity.  
The characterization process may be susceptible to undue outside influence and 
political pressure, both of which must be monitored and controlled.  See infra notes 
112–13 and accompanying text. 
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number of different factors:  the basic utility of the product; the 
price of the product compared with the average market price of 
categorically similar items; the degree of market finality of the 
product; the degree of market access and demand; the degree of 
public benefit derived from the product; the novelty of the 
product; and others.20 
Although the graduated consumption tax is designed to tax 
consumption rather than income and savings, its primary 
purpose is to remove the individual taxpayer’s burden of 
computation and the liability of miscalculation.  Under the 
graduated consumption tax model, individual taxpayers do not 
compute or file anything when paying their taxes.  As with an 
ordinary sales tax, taxes would be computed directly and 
immediately upon sales. 
The graduated consumption tax model thus employs an 
administrative framework similar to the credit-invoice value-
added tax.  Sellers along the entire chain of production and 
distribution would be required to keep accurate transaction 
records to make sure they are charging and collecting the 
appropriate tax on each item they sell.21  And, since the 
individual taxpayer would not file any paperwork, the 
government only would audit sellers.22 
Although the filing burden of the individual taxpayer would 
be removed, the graduated consumption tax would not shift 
overall tax liability.  Currently, the income tax system is 
progressive, placing a greater tax burden on the wealthiest 
 
20 These factors are recommended and nonexhaustive.  Some of the factors listed 
are self-explanatory.  Others might need some clarification.  The degree of finality 
of the product refers to a product’s placement within the stream of manufacturing.  
This factor attempts to account for a component of the character of items sold by 
business entities that are not producing the final version of the product ultimately 
consumed by the market at large.  For example, a product may pass through many 
different levels of manufacturing before final sale on the open market. 
 The novelty of the product encompasses two distinct concepts:  whether the item 
is new or used, and whether or not the item is new to the market in general. 
21 See infra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
22 The exception would be the informal or “backyard” seller, who would be 
required to declare the sale on the appropriate form and file it with the agency.  In 
turn, the agency would assess the appropriate tax on the item and issue the bill to 
the purchasing taxpayer for payment.  See infra notes 117–18, 128 and 
accompanying text. 
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taxpayers.23  Since the design of the graduated consumption tax 
is also progressive, it would achieve the same results.  Necessary 
items, such as food, clothing, housing, and medicine, would be 
subject to little or no tax at all.  All people, whether wealthy or 
poor, need these basic items.24  Conversely, luxury items such as 
yachts and private jets would be assessed at the highest tax 
rates.25 
The graduated consumption tax system would impose federal 
sales tax computed according to a sliding scale.  The algorithm 
that defines the scale might be summed up with one phrase:  the 
greater the luxury, the greater the tax.  According to its 
character, every consumable item would be placed somewhere 
along this continuum and taxed accordingly.  And, since every 
consumable product or service would be taxable, the graduated 
consumption tax would draw its revenue from a virtually 
unrestricted tax base.26  Thus, unlike the other alternative tax 
models, the large tax base would ensure progressive revenue 
generation comparable to the income tax system without 
imposing unpalatably high tax rates.27 
From the taxpayer’s perspective, the graduated consumption 
tax would be less complicated than the income tax system.  Even 
 
23 INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, THE EFFECTS OF REPLACING MOST 
FEDERAL TAXES WITH A NATIONAL SALES TAX:  A STATE-BY-STATE 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter ITEP]; DOUGLAS A. 
KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 1.1000, at 3–4 (4th ed. 1999). 
24 Practically speaking, degree may be a function of character.  For example, 
staple food items available at ordinary grocery stores should be subject to zero tax 
liability.  Meanwhile, gourmet items less necessary would be assessed at the higher 
rates. 
25 One of the fundamental challenges of the graduated consumption tax system 
would be designating the relative necessity and the degree of luxury of any given 
item.  In some cases, the assessment should be relatively simple.  For example, few 
could reasonably argue that a 250-foot yacht or a Gulfstream V jet are items 
necessary to sustain only the most basic level of human comfort.  In other situations, 
however, assessment would prove more difficult.  For example, it may be difficult to 
draw factual or otherwise principled distinctions between items of the same general 
description.  While shoes are clearly a necessity, Manolo Blahniks clearly are not.  
Likewise, while houses may be necessary, mansions are not.  Although the 
foregoing examples may be easy to distinguish, drawing close lines between 
different types of clothes, automobiles, or homes, for example, may prove quite 
challenging.  Navigating these dark waters would be a necessary challenge of the 
graduated consumption tax system. 
26 See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.  Cf. infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
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if the proposed system proves more administratively 
complicated, the burdens on individual taxpayers would be less.  
Individual taxpayers would not be responsible for filling out 
paperwork based on tens of thousands of pages of rules.  
Instead, as with any sales tax, the taxes they owe would be 
calculated at the time of purchase and attached to the bill of sale.  
The only burden on individual taxpayers would be paying that 
bill.28 
II 
FRAMING THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX PROPOSAL 
The income tax system encumbers all taxpayers with the 
responsibility of computing tax liability based on equations and 
tables that are not always easy to understand, filling out and 
filing all the proper forms and schedules correctly, and making 
the appropriate payments on time.29  As if calculating tax 
liability were not challenging enough, the government may 
impose severe penalties for failing to compute or file taxes 
correctly.30  Of course, imposing such penalties assumes that 
 
28 Of course, taxpayers would have access to the character index and schedules of 
tax rates.  In addition, merchants would be required to post the applicable tax rate 
to items they sell in order to give notice of the tax rate attached to the sale price. 
29 These responsibilities, which this Article refers to as the taxpayer’s “filing 
burdens,” are quite significant.  In fact, the IRS estimates that the average taxpayer, 
using a tax software program, takes about forty hours to figure out taxes.  David 
Keating, A Taxing Trend:  The Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, 
NTU POLICY PAPER 120 (Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 17, 2006.  
The number of hours doubles to over eighty if the taxpayer is self-employed.  Id.  A 
Tax Foundation study estimated that “[i]n 2005 individuals, business and nonprofits 
[spent] an estimated 6 billion hours complying with the federal income tax code, 
with an estimated compliance cost of over $265.1 billion.”  Moody et al., supra note 
7, at 1.  For a comprehensive discussion of the other various forms of income tax 
burdens, see generally JAMES L. PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS:  THE BURDENS OF 
THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM (1993) (pointing out, among other things, that it costs the 
government about $65 to raise $100 under the income tax system). 
30 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6662, 6702 (2006).  In criminal tax cases, the 
prosecution must prove that the tax evasion was willful.  Cheek v. United States, 
498 U.S. 192, 201–02 (1991) (“Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in 
criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty 
on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and 
intentionally violated that duty. . . .  In such a case, if the Government proves actual 
knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied 
the knowledge component of the willfulness requirement.  But carrying this burden 
requires negating a defendant’s claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that 
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each taxpayer has the ability, the time, and the means to sift 
through the tens of thousands of pages of tax codes and filing 
instructions.  Yet, flawless income tax computation requires a 
significant amount of skill that even tax experts may lack.31 
Shouldering this monumental responsibility requires the 
taxpayer to become relatively well versed in tax law.  But most 
taxpayers have not mastered over 60,000 pages of tax code and 
over 500 forms.32  Not surprisingly, many taxpayers delegate that 
responsibility to paid income tax professionals.33  Meanwhile, 
 
because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not 
violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.”). 
31 The United States Government Accountability Office found that virtually all 
the chain tax preparers it studied made significant errors in tax filing and 
calculation.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX 
RETURN PREPARERS:  IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS 
ERRORS 14 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS] (“All 19 of 
our visits to tax return preparers affiliated with chains showed problems.  Nearly all 
of the returns prepared for us were incorrect to some degree, and several of the 
preparers gave us very bad tax advice . . . .  While some errors had fairly small tax 
consequences, others had very large consequences.  Incorrectly reported refunds 
ranged from refunds overclaimed by nearly $2000 to underclaims of over $1700.”).  
See also Keating, supra note 29, at 120 (“The Tax Code is so convoluted that no one 
inside or outside of the IRS understands it.  For many years Money magazine’s 
annual test of tax preparers for a hypothetical household proved that paid 
professionals often make huge mistakes.  In 1998, the last year Money administered 
the test, all 46 tested tax professionals got a different answer, and not one got it 
right.  The pro who directed the test admitted ‘that his computation is not the only 
possible correct answer’ since the tax law is so murky.  The tax computed by these 
pros ‘ranged from $34,240 to $68,912.’  The closest answer still erred in the 
government’s favor by $610.”). 
32 Absurdly, taxpayers are expected to know more about the over seven million 
words of tax rules than those who are paid to give tax advice at the IRS assistance 
centers.  John Semmens, Tax Filing Burden Continues to Grow, HEARTLAND 
PERSP. (Heartland Inst., Chi., Ill.), Apr. 8, 2005 (“In 2002, government auditors 
found IRS taxpayer assistance centers give the wrong advice for filling out forms a 
distressingly large 50 percent of the time.  Taxpayers’ distress is intensified by the 
IRS’s refusal to stand behind the advice it gives out.  Taxpayers are not relieved of 
any penalties they may face for errors on their tax forms resulting from following 
the advice given by the IRS assistance centers.”). 
33 According to the 2006 Tax Foundation Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Taxes and 
Wealth, 36 percent of those surveyed indicated they paid an outside tax professional 
to prepare their income taxes.  2006 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 5.  This figure may be 
understated.  A National Taxpayers Union policy paper written by David Keating, 
citing to the revised March 17, 2006, Taxpayer Usage Report of the IRS, indicates 
over 60 percent of tax returns have been signed by paid preparers since 2004.  
Keating, supra note 29, at 120.  That figure jumps to an astounding 90 percent when 
including computer-prepared returns.  Id.  The policy paper also indicates that the 
average fee charged by H&R Block in 2006 for income tax preparation was around 
$150.  Id. 
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immediate and significant inequities reverberate as the 
government continues to force taxpayers to calculate their own 
tax liabilities.34 
As a result of its complexity, the income tax system creates 
unnecessary and often unintended tax breaks, or “loopholes.”35  
Of course, in order to take advantage of a loophole, a taxpayer 
must first know how to find one and properly utilize it.  
Accordingly, the benefits of these loopholes are enjoyed almost 
exclusively by the affluent or the well advised.36  By successfully 
utilizing these loopholes,37 taxpayers with the greatest tax 
burdens are able to shirk the full extent of their potential tax 
liability, thereby shifting a greater proportionate burden onto 
the backs of others.  Unfortunately, taming the current income 
tax system has proven a Sisyphean task, as attempts to close 
loopholes often result in the creation of more loopholes.38 
A.  The Usual Suspects:  Major Income Tax Alternatives 
Most Americans agree that a “fair” tax should generate 
sufficient government revenue while imposing minimum burdens 
 
34 The brunt of these inequities falls on the poor. 
When examined by income level, compliance cost is found to be highly 
regressive, taking a larger toll on low-income taxpayers as a percentage of 
income than high-income taxpayers.  On the low end, taxpayers with 
adjusted gross income (AGI) under $20,000 incur a compliance cost equal 
to 5.9 percent of income while the compliance cost incurred by taxpayers 
with AGI over $200,000 amounts to just 0.5 percent of income. 
Moody et al., supra note 7, at 1. 
35 For example, a recent clarification in tax law intended to benefit the poor 
inadvertently created a tax loophole for the rich.  Mary Beth Franklin, A Loophole 
is Born, KIPLINGER.COM, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/ 
archives/2006/03/loophole.html (“Call it the law of unintended consequences at 
work.  A new law designed to standardize the definition of who qualifies as a child 
for tax purposes has opened a gaping loophole that could be exploited by upper-
income families with young children and older, ‘boomerang’ kids living at home.”). 
36 The irony is that many loopholes are the result of tax law designed to benefit 
the poor, who cannot afford to be well advised.  See, e.g., id. 
37 Loophole generation may be the result of earnest attempts to immortalize an 
outdated income taxation system that is far beyond its natural life expectancy.  
Although tax rules and exceptions were created to achieve fairness, they have 
transformed common-sense income tax principles into a nonsensical, dizzying mess.  
See infra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
38 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
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on the taxpayer.39  What form best achieves those functions, 
however, is more controversial.40  Indeed, disagreement existed 
even at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the income 
tax system was adopted in the United States.41 
However the income tax may be characterized presently, it 
was not always considered draconian.  In fact, the income tax 
was relatively well regarded until about the 1970s.42  
Nevertheless, present frustration may have been unavoidable.  
The country’s expanding economic complexity eventually 
outgrew the capabilities of the income tax system’s original 
design.  To keep pace, the tax code also grew, increasing in 
complexity to accommodate the changing needs of society.  
Cannibalized by its own reforms, the income tax code is now a 
hopeless, quixotic mess.43  Sadly, the mess is an unintended 
consequence of obdurate efforts to mend a broken system and 
the unwillingness of some to admit that it is beyond repair.44 
The solutions presented to address the problems of the 
income tax system are as diverse as the problems themselves.  
The most widely recognized solutions suggest either broad 
 
39 Graetz, supra note 3, at 282 (“The tax system can, and should, be fixed without 
such a shift in the nation’s tax burdens.  As the conservative New York Times 
columnist William Safire, who called the flat tax ‘draconian,’ has said, ‘Most of us 
accept as “fair” this principle:  The poor should pay nothing, the middlers 
something, the rich the highest percentage.’”); William G. Gale, Tax Reform in the 
Real World, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 387, 391 (1998) (reviewing MICHEAL J. GRAETZ, 
THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997)) (“There is broad 
agreement, in principle at least, on the characteristics of a good tax:  It should raise 
sufficient revenue to finance government and it should be simple, fair, and 
economically efficient.”). 
40 Gale, supra note 39, at 391 (“In practice, there is probably less agreement on 
what some of these principles mean; fairness, for example, is generally in the ‘eyes 
of the beholder.’  In addition, extreme disagreement exists about the relative value 
of each of these characteristics and about how they should be traded off against one 
another.”). 
41 See generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1999) (tracing the history of the direct tax clauses and the enactment of the 
Sixteenth Amendment). 
42 Michael Graetz has studied and written extensively about this shift in public 
perception.  See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 3, at 272. 
43 Or, in the words of Michael Graetz, the tax code is a “horrible mess.”  Id. at 
282. 
44 Almost tragically, even altruistic gestures of the government appear to have 
the opposite effect.  For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 actually 
generated more paperwork than existed before its implementation.  See infra note 
45 and accompanying text. 
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reform of the income tax system or scrapping the system 
altogether and starting from scratch.45  Indeed, the idea of 
scrapping the current income tax system has tantalized taxpayers 
and economists for some time.46  The most seriously considered 
alternatives include the value-added tax, the flat tax, the 
personal consumption tax, and the national retail sales tax.47 
1.  The Value-Added Tax 
The value-added tax (hereinafter “VAT”) has essentially two 
forms, the credit-invoice VAT and the subtraction VAT.48  Both 
forms tax the value a business adds to a product at the time of 
sale.49  What distinguishes the two forms is the method of 
calculating the tax liability.  Under the credit-invoice method, 
the tax is calculated on each individual transaction at the time of 
sale.50  Under the subtraction method, the tax is calculated by 
subtracting a business’s aggregate purchases of goods and 
services from the aggregate sales of its own goods and services.51 
Tax liability is easier to verify under the credit-invoice VAT.  
Individual transactions can be traced and authenticated by 
comparing the receipts and records of the businesses and 
individuals involved at any point in the production chain, 
 
45 “Simplifying” the income tax system was not the answer.  Congress tried it 
twice before–once in 1980 and again in 1995–but the income tax system’s 
interminable complexity proved too great a juggernaut.  See Keating, supra note 29, 
at 120 (“In an attempt to bring the paperwork burden under control Congress 
passed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. . . . [T]he law has been a failure, 
largely due to the increasing burdens at the IRS.”)  This Article presumes the 
current income tax system is incapable of any meaningful reform.  See supra notes 
35–38 and accompanying text. 
46 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 961, 961 (1992) (“For over a century, tax scholars and economists have 
debated the merits of replacing the existing income tax with a tax on 
consumption.”). 
47 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-37, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION:  POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE TAXES ON TAXPAYERS 
AND ADMINISTRATORS 55–188 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION] 
(presenting analysis on the national sales tax model). 
48 Id. at 127. 
49 The value added to a product by a business equals the difference between the 
amount the business spent purchasing the product and the amount for which the 
same business sold that product.  Id. 
50 Id. at 127, 133. 
51 Id. at 127, 145. 
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including the retail level.52  Because of this inherent verifiability, 
the credit-invoice VAT could impose tax at multiple rates.53 
Conversely, tax liability under the subtraction VAT is difficult 
to verify because it is based solely upon the business’s own 
records, which cannot be cross-referenced against the records of 
other businesses to verify their accuracy.54  Accordingly, to 
minimize underreporting, the subtraction VAT should be 
assessed only at a single rate.55 
Both forms of the VAT eliminate the individual taxpayer’s 
filing burden.56  The VAT places that burden on businesses, 
requiring them to remit the difference between the taxes paid on 
their purchases of goods and services and the taxes received on 
the sales of their own goods and services.57  Even though the 
burden of remitting taxes would be placed on businesses, the 
burden of ultimately paying the taxes is passed on to the 
individual taxpayer.58 
 
52 Id. at 136, 146.  See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-86-91, 
TAX POLICY:  CHOOSING AMONG CONSUMPTION TAXES 13 (1986) [hereinafter 
GAO, TAX POLICY] (“The invoice method allows for a readily administrable 
verification of tax liability because each business must keep accurate records of 
total tax paid and charged, with supporting invoices.  The trail of invoices also 
allows cross-checking for accuracy should the business be selected for audit.”). 
53 The GAO notes that a single rate would be administratively more desirable.  
See GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 134. 
54 Id. at 146. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 127. 
57 Id. 
58 Businesses do initially remit some portion of the taxes, but they eventually 
receive a credit for the amount they pay. 
 Under [the credit-invoice VAT], for every sale within the production 
and distribution system, a tax is calculated, added to the price of the 
product, and shown on the invoice that sellers in these countries normally 
are required to furnish to purchasers.  At the end of each tax period, a 
business subtracts the sum of the taxes that it paid on its purchases from 
the taxes that it collected on its sales.  The difference is its net tax liability, 
which it remits to the government. 
   . . . . 
 An example may help to clarify how the invoice method works [sic]  
This example is of a value-added tax of 20 percent applied to the 
production and distribution of baseball bats.  A tree farmer harvests an ash 
tree and sells it to a lumber yard for $5 per unit.  This represents the value 
added to the ash seedling by the farmer.  The farmer adds $1 of tax to his 
price (20 percent of $5) and collects a total of $6 from the lumber yard.  He 
remits $1 of tax to the government.  The lumber yard takes the $5 unit of 
ash, cuts it into rectangular prisms, and sells them to the bat maker for $10 
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The credit-invoice VAT is commonly employed by many 
industrialized countries.59  Yet often it is supplemented with 
some form of income tax because the system is unable to 
generate sufficient revenue due to its limited tax base.60 
 
(another $5 being added in value by cutting the wood).  In addition to the 
$10, the bat maker pays $2 of tax.  The lumber yard remits to the 
government the difference between the total amount of tax it collected ($2) 
from the sale of its product and the total amount of tax it paid ($1) for raw 
materials.  If audited, the lumber yard must be able to produce the invoice 
from the tree farmer showing the $1 tax paid to support its claim for the $1 
tax credit. 
 The same procedures are followed by the wholesaler and retailer.  The 
wholesaler buys the bats for $20 plus $4 of tax and sells them to the retailer 
for $25 plus $5 of tax.  Eventually, the consumer buys the finished baseball 
bats from the retailer for $36–$30 for the bats and $6 for the value-added 
tax. 
 A retail sales tax of 20 percent would generate the same tax revenue 
($6), but the responsibility for collecting the tax and remitting it to the 
government would belong to the retailer alone.  Under the value-added 
method, four businesses remit 1 dollar and one business, the bat maker, 
remits 2 dollars of tax. 
GAO, TAX POLICY, supra note 52, at 13–14 (footnote omitted). 
 As the above example illustrates, the VAT system simply spreads the burden of 
remitting the taxes among the businesses linked within the production and 
distribution chains.  See id.  In the end, since each business would receive its credit, 
the retail consumer ultimately would pay the entire amount of tax liability.  See id. 
59 GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 133.  See also id. at 131 (“In 
1996, the standard VAT rates in most of the world’s industrialized countries ranged 
between 15 and 25 percent.  Most of these countries had different rates for 
necessities and/or luxuries.  Most of these countries also relied on an income tax, as 
well as the credit VAT, for their revenues.”) (footnote omitted). 
60 Id. at 131, 133.  The tax base is limited because businesses end up passing the 
tax burden on to the individual taxpayer.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
The graduated consumption tax model, by comparison, requires both individuals 
and businesses to contribute to the tax base at the retail and production levels, 
respectively.  See infra note 124 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, given the 
constraints of the credit VAT, if it were “collected at the various stages of 
production and distribution (including retail), [and] replaced the income and 
employment taxes, the rate could be as high or higher than the common rates of 15 
to 25 percent currently in effect in industrialized countries.”  GAO, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 139.  Given the comprehensive tax base of the 
graduated consumption tax, the average mean tax rate could be as low as 13 
percent.  See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text. 
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2.  The Flat Tax 
The flat tax would attach a single rate of tax to the wages of 
all individuals and businesses, regardless of income level.61  Since 
it would tax only the accumulation of unsaved income, the flat 
tax technically is considered a consumption tax.62  
Administratively, the flat tax would be similar to the income tax 
because it would impose upon taxpayers analogous burdens of 
tax computation and filing.  For example, to counterbalance the 
inherent regressivity of the main feature of the flat tax–its fixed 
rate–the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) concluded that 
“[i]ndividuals would be required to make the calculations to 
determine deductions, and thus, properly claiming dependents, 
which has proven troublesome in the current system, would 
continue as a problem area.”63 
3.  The Personal Consumption Tax 
The personal consumption tax is not designed to lighten the 
individual taxpayer’s filing burdens.  The personal consumption 
tax is similar to the present income tax, except that it would tax 
total taxpayer consumption rather than income.64  Unlike the flat 
tax, the personal consumption tax would tax consumption at 
graduated rates based on income status.65  But, like the flat tax, 
the personal consumption tax would not remove the individual 
taxpayer’s filing burdens.  In fact, it would increase filing 
burdens by requiring taxpayers to add their income and deduct 
their savings to compute their tax liability.66  Taxpayers not only 
would have to calculate their total income accurately, they would 
have to save all their receipts and calculate their expenses with 
equal precision.67 
 
61 The GAO’s analysis focused specifically on the Hall and Rabushka version of 
the flat tax.  GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 157 (citing ROBERT E. 
HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2nd ed. 1995). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 157, 162. 
64 See id. at 174 (“In general, under a personal consumption tax, taxpayers add up 
all the funds they have received during the year and then deduct the amount they 
saved.  The remaining amount is a measure of the taxpayer’s spending on goods and 
services for consumption over the year, and this amount is subject to tax.”). 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 178, 180. 
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4.  The National Sales Tax 
On January 4, 2005, Congress introduced “The Fair Tax Act 
of 2005”68–the latest version of a national sales tax program.69  
The bill was designed to replace the income tax system with a 
national sales tax at a single, fixed rate.70  The national sales tax 
model was both novel and controversial.  Although the 
legislation proposed an initial fixed tax rate of 23 percent,71 the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy72 concluded that the 
national sales tax program actually would require a single, fixed 
tax-exclusive rate73 between 45 and 60 percent.74  In addition to 
the high rate of taxation, the Institute found that a fixed-rate 
national sales tax would shift the tax burden disproportionately 
to low and middle-income households.75  The Institute concluded 
 
68 The Act was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 4, 2005, 
by Mr. Linder on behalf of himself and Mr. DeLay, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. 
Culberson, Mr. Deal of Georgia, Mr. Flake, Mr. Gutknecht, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. 
Kingston, Mr. Westmoreland, and Mr. Price of Georgia.  The Fair Tax Act of 2005, 
H.R. 25, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. tit. 1,  §§ 101, 201. 
71 Id. tit. 2 § 201, ch. 1, § 101(b)(1).  The 23 percent rate is tax inclusive.  William 
G. Gale, A Note on the Required Tax Rate in a National Retail Sales Tax:  
Preliminary Estimates for 2005–2014, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 12, 2004), available 
at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gale/20040812.htm. 
72 The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) is a non-profit, non-
partisan research and education organization that works on government 
taxation and spending policy issues. ITEP’s unique resources and capabilities 
enable it to provide policymakers, advocates, and the public with accurate, 
useful, and timely information regarding state and federal tax systems and 
how they affect taxpayers at different income levels. 
 ITEP’s mission is to keep policymakers and the public informed of the 
effects of current and proposed tax polices on tax fairness, government 
budgets and sound economic policy. 
About ITEP, http://www.itepnet.org/itepdesc01.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
73 This Article uses the terms “tax exclusive” and “tax inclusive” when referring 
to tax rates.  The term “tax inclusive” refers to the tax rate of the entire cost of 
purchasing an item, including the tax paid.  The term “tax exclusive,” by 
comparison, refers to the tax rate of the purchase price of the item only, not 
including the tax paid.  For example, assume an individual purchases an item priced 
at $80.  Assume also that the individual pays an additional $20 in taxes.  Thus, the 
entire cost of purchasing the item equals $100.  In this example, the tax-exclusive 
rate is 25 percent (20 ÷ 80 x 100) while the tax-inclusive rate is only 20 percent (20 ÷ 
100 x 100).  As illustrated by this example, failing to identify whether the rate is tax 
inclusive or tax exclusive could be misleading. 
74 See ITEP, supra note 23, at 2 (citing Gale, supra note 71). 
75 Id. at 3. 
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that “replacing most federal taxes with a national sales tax would 
mean very large tax increases on most Americans and very large 
tax cuts for the wealthy.”76 
The national sales tax model presented several other potential 
problems.  First, it purported to draw its revenue from a reduced 
tax base.77  For example, business-to-business transactions would 
be exempted from taxation for fear of cascading tax upon tax.78  
Second, the national sales tax model’s refunds and credit 
programs could facilitate increased tax avoidance and evasion.79  
Finally, while the national sales tax would reduce the individual 
taxpayer’s filing burden, it would not eliminate that burden.  
Indeed, some taxpayer work would still be required.  The poor, 
for example, would still be required to file forms to qualify for 
tax refunds or credits.80 
 
76 Id. 
77 The anemic tax base explains the exorbitant tax rates under the national sales 
tax model.  Revenue-neutral tax rates (when compared to the income tax system) 
are possible under the graduated consumption tax because of its broader tax base.  
See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text.  Perhaps the credit-invoice VAT or 
the national retail sales tax might work better if their respective tax bases were 
broadened to tax consumption along the entire production and distribution chains 
using the “consumption events theory,” or something similar.  Nevertheless, the 
theoretical considerations involved in increasing the tax base under either of those 
models may result in a tax model very similar to the graduated consumption tax. 
78 See H.R. 25, 109th Cong. § 201, ch. 2 (1st Sess. 2005).  See also William G. 
Gale, The Required Tax Rate in a National Retail Sales Tax, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 443, 
445 (1999) (“In a pure retail sales tax, business-to-business transactions would not 
be included either, because the purchase is used as an input, not as household 
consumption. . . .  Thus, business purchases would not enter the net tax base . . . .”).  
However, the graduated consumption tax base is configured under a different 
theory of consumption.  See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
79 Gale, supra note 78, at 451 (warning that individuals might attempt to register 
as business entities to take advantage of the tax credits). 
80 For example, under the Fair Tax Act of 2005, taxpayers must apply for 
exemptions and credits.  See, e.g.,  H.R. 25 § 201, ch. 3, § 304.  By comparison, the 
graduated consumption tax model does not require the ordinary taxpayer to request 
or provide any paperwork.  From the consumer’s point of view, the transaction 
would function no differently than the sales taxes most states currently employ.  
Unlike the Fair Tax Act of 2005, the individual taxpayer has no tax computation 
burdens under the graduated consumption tax model because the exemptions and 
refunds are built into the tax rate calculations themselves. 
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B.  The Other Players:  Income Tax Alternatives Proposed by 
Scholars 
The graduated consumption tax is not the first scholastic 
attempt to reform the income tax system.  In fact, several 
scholars already have proposed noteworthy income tax 
alternatives.  Professor Michael Graetz has proposed a 
sophisticated alternative tax model that also seeks to remove the 
filing burdens from the majority of individual taxpayers by 
combining essentially a single-rate VAT-style consumption tax 
with income taxes, payroll tax withholdings, and corporate 
taxes.81  The Graetz model, however, would not eliminate 
entirely the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens.82  Moreover, 
administrative concerns aside, the graduated consumption tax 
presents a less complicated overall design than the Graetz 
model, which fuses several different tax structures into a single 
patchwork.83 
Also noteworthy is the “X-Tax.”  Designed by Professor 
David Bradford, the X-Tax essentially couples a business tax 
with a graduated tax on employment compensation.84  Because 
of its complicated design, and since the X-tax is a form of 
subtraction VAT, administration of the tax may prove 
challenging.85  Most significantly, however, the X-Tax would not 
relieve individual taxpayers’ filing burdens, because it would 
complement, rather than replace, the present income tax 
system.86 
Perhaps the most practical solution to individual taxpayers’ 
filing burdens is Professor Joseph Bankman’s pilot program 
called “ReadyReturn.”87  The program would require 
California’s Franchise Tax Board to complete the taxpayer’s 
state income tax return using the wage data the Board already 
 
81 Graetz, supra note 3, at 284–99. 
82 Id. at 295 (explaining that, under his plan, “only about 25 million income tax 
returns would be filed each year”). 
83 See id. at 284–99. 
84 David F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 
TAX NOTES 383, 384 (1988). 
85 See id. at 387; cf. GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 146. 
86 See Bradford, supra note 84, at 385 (“The X-Tax could be administered in 
conjunction with the existing income tax.”). 
87 Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens:  The California 
ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431 (2005). 
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receives from employers.88  Upon review, taxpayers can accept 
the government’s work, make changes to it, or fill out and file a 
new return entirely on their own.89 
While the ReadyReturn program is a thoughtful and efficient 
approach to relieving the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens,90 it 
has its own shortcomings.  First, the ReadyReturn program 
appears to be based on the ideal that there is one correct way, or 
at least one “most” correct way, for taxpayers to calculate their 
individual tax liabilities.91  Unfortunately, the reality is that the 
income tax’s overwhelming complexity now allows for significant 
computational variance within individual tax returns.92  Perhaps 
anticipating this problem, the ReadyReturn would be offered 
only to those who ordinarily file the simplest returns, leaving the 
overwhelming majority of the taxpaying population–including 
those with the most complicated returns and, hence, the most 
onerous filing burdens–no better off than they were before.93 
Moreover, the taxpayers who actually would benefit from the 
program might be overcharged by the government, as even tax 
experts seem incapable of taming the tax code’s complexity.94  
As a result, and quite understandably, Professor Bankman 
speculates that some taxpayers would nevertheless prefer to 
double-check the government’s work by doing it themselves, 
 
88 See id. at 1432. 
89 Id. 
90 To its credit, the ReadyReturn program achieves the same primary purpose of 
the graduated consumption tax model without requiring a complete change of the 
income tax system. 
91 “The ReadyReturns stated the wage income reported to the state and the 
tentative tax liability produced by that wage income.”  Id. at 1432.  The inference 
drawn from this statement, as well as the impetus behind the program itself, is that 
the filing burden is simply a matter of math, work, and time.  But as any taxpayer 
might attest, filing taxes is never that simple.  See supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
92 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
93 “The California Franchise Tax Board, or FTB, has come up with a plan that 
would greatly simplify tax return filing for over 3 million Californians.  These 
citizens have only wage income, and do not itemize deductions.”  Joseph Bankman, 
ReadyReturn:  A Brief Explanation, The California ReadyReturn Project, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/bankman/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).  
According to the latest census information, which estimated California’s population 
in 2005 at 36,132,147, the ReadyReturn program would help less than 10 percent of 
Californians.  See U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts, California, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). 
94 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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using a software program or even submitting their returns to a 
tax preparer.95 
So, as thoughtful and efficient as the ReadyReturn program 
appears, it hardly can be considered a comprehensive solution 
when it seems that over 90 percent of taxpayers will be excluded 
from the program,96 and when some of the participating 
taxpayers would do the work the ReadyReturn program was 
designed to eliminate anyway.97  Administratively, fewer entities 
would be responsible for filing taxes under the graduated 
consumption tax model.98  Indeed, Professor Bankman and 
Professor David A. Weisbach previously have argued that an 
ideal consumption tax is preferable to an ideal income tax.99  For 
these reasons, the graduated consumption tax can achieve the 
goals of the ReadyReturn program with equal or better 
administration, equity, and economic efficiency. 
III 
THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL 
While the graduated consumption tax is envisioned as a 
complete replacement to the income tax system, it also could 
function as an income tax supplement.  In fact, the European 
VATs, as well as many other proposed income tax alternatives, 
 
95 “Some taxpayers would be thrilled to simply have a return to sign; others 
would want to show the ReadyReturn to their preparer, run the return through 
Turbo Tax or other software, or ‘manually’ double-check the State’s numbers.”  
Bankman, supra note 93. 
96 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
98 Under a credit-invoice VAT, only sellers–not consumers–would be 
responsible for filing taxes.  See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
99 Professors Bankman and Weisbach provide many persuasive reasons for 
resetting some of the traditional notions that favor an income tax over a 
consumption tax.  See generally Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The 
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1413 (2006).  For example, unlike the income tax, a consumption tax would 
not distort savings decisions.  Id. at 1422.  In addition, a consumption tax would 
generate greater efficiency.  Id. at 1455; cf. infra notes 182–90.  Professors Bankman 
and Weisbach based their study on the assumption that a consumption tax should 
be neutral, or tax all consumption at the same rate.  Bankman & Weisbach, supra, 
at 1414.  Obviously, the graduated consumption tax does not follow the same 
assumption. 
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supplement, rather than replace, the income tax.100  However, 
the graduated consumption tax model does not contain the same 
design limitations as the European VATs.  Unlike the European 
VATs, the graduated consumption tax would not need 
supplementation because it would generate sufficient amounts of 
revenue on its own.101  Moreover, the primary goal of the 
graduated consumption tax is to remove all the individual 
taxpayer’s filing burdens.  Thus, there would be no reason to 
endure the administrative or economic headaches associated 
with keeping the income tax. 
Accordingly, like the Fair Tax Act of 2005, the graduated 
consumption tax model would replace not only the income tax, 
but also the payroll and estate and gift taxes.102  In addition, 
since income would no longer be taxed, the repeal of the 16th 
Amendment would be appropriate.  Excise taxes, however, 
should remain unchanged, as they have no effect on the 
individual taxpayer except to increase the tax base and, in turn, 
decrease tax rates.103 
Functionally, the graduated consumption tax would operate 
like a national sales tax at both the production and retail 
levels.104  Unlike under the Fair Tax Act, tax rates under the 
graduated consumption tax model vary progressively in relation 
to the character of the specific item being consumed.  
Accordingly, credits, refunds, and allowances would be 
unnecessary because they would be built into the progressive 
nature of the tax rates themselves.105  And, since there would be 
no exceptions or exemptions, all spending generated within the 
United States would be subject to taxation under the 
 
100 See GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 133; Graetz, supra note 3, 
at 285–99. 
101 See infra notes 139–50 and accompanying text. 
102 Cf. H.R. 25, 109th Cong. tit. 1, §§ 101–03 (1st Sess. 2005).  In addition, the 
graduated consumption tax model may adopt the Congressional Findings related to 
the income, payroll, and estate and gift taxes as well.  See H.R. 25 § 2(a)–(c). 
103 Cf. id. tit. 1, § 104. 
104 The graduated consumption tax model may incorporate some or all of 
Congress’s findings relating to an administration of a national sales tax.  The 
exception, of course, is that the national sales tax rates should be graduated 
according to the character of necessity or luxury associated with each particular 
item taxed and should include a broader tax base.  See id. § 2(d), (e). 
105 Cf. id. tit. 2, § 201, chs. 2, 3. 
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appropriate classification,106 including interstate and 
international purchases.107 
A.  The Characterization Model 
Like the income tax system,108 the graduated consumption tax 
model is progressive.109  Under the graduated consumption tax 
model, tax rates are organized into graduated tiers.  The tax 
rates increase progressively from one tier to the next.  An 
illustration of the tax rates110 under a graduated consumption tax 








106 All items consumed shall be subject to tax.  While the purchase of homes 
would be subject to tax at the rate corresponding to the characterization of the 
home, an interesting question is whether rent should also be taxed.  Technically, the 
act of paying rent is a form of consumption; accordingly, rent should be subject to 
tax.  Nevertheless, the tax rate associated with the rent would likely be de minimis, 
as the majority of rent probably would be characterized as a necessity. 
107 This policy would eliminate some of the benefits of offshore accounts.  Since 
there would be no income tax advantage to holding assets outside of the United 
States, many of those assets might find their way back into the United States.  
Furthermore, since all consumption within the United States would be subject to 
tax–even the consumption of international goods and services–there would be no 
tax benefit to purchasing products from offshore entities. 
108 See KAHN, supra note 23, § 1.1000 at 3–4. 
109 The term “progressive” is used carefully here.  In the income tax sense, 
“progressive” means the tax burden increases along with income, ensuring a greater 
tax burden for the wealthy.  For the graduated consumption tax model, the term 
“progressive” must have a technically different meaning, even if its impact is 
practically the same.  Under the graduated consumption tax model, the tax burden 
would increase along with consumption.  Thus, the greatest tax burden would be 
supported by the most excessive consumers.  The most decadent consumers often 
are those with the greatest spending power.  Thus, while the “progressive” nature of 
the consumption tax technically targets excessive consumption, the greatest tax 
burden would also be borne by the wealthiest taxpayers, as in the income tax 
system. 
110 Here, the tax rates are intended to be tax exclusive.  Whether the graduated 
consumption tax model ultimately utilizes tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive percentages 
is largely an irrelevant matter of semantics.  Nevertheless, to avoid any possible 
confusion, the graduated consumption tax model should utilize only one or the 
other and the government should broadcast its choice clearly to the public. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Tax Tier Tax Range 
Fundamental Necessity 0% Sales Tax 
Moderate Necessity 0–4% Sales Tax 
Marginal Necessity 5–9% Sales Tax 
Marginal Luxury 10–25% Sales Tax 
Moderate Luxury 33–67% Sales Tax 
Consummate Luxury 67%–100% Sales Tax 
 
Each tier could be further subdivided into a specific number 
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TABLE 2 
 
Tier Degree Tax Rate 
First Tier:  
Fundamental 
Necessity 
(No subdivision) 0% Sales Tax 
First Step 1% Sales Tax 
Second Step 2% Sales Tax 
Third Step 3% Sales Tax 
Second Tier:   
Moderate Necessity 
(1% Steps) 
Fourth Step 4% Sales Tax 
First Step 5% Sales Tax 
Second Step 6% Sales Tax 
Third Step 7% Sales Tax 
Fourth Step 8% Sales Tax 
Third Tier:   
Marginal Necessity 
(1% Steps) 
Fifth Step 9% Sales Tax 
First Step 10% Sales Tax 
Second Step 11% Sales Tax 
Third Step 12% Sales Tax 
Fourth Step 17% Sales Tax 
Fifth Step 22% Sales Tax 
Fourth Tier: 
Marginal Luxury 
(Three 1% Steps, 
Three 5% Steps) 
Sixth Step 27% Sales Tax 
First Step 32% Sales Tax 
Second Step 39% Sales Tax 
Third Step 46% Sales Tax 




Fifth Step 60% Sales Tax 
First Step 67% Sales Tax 
Second Step 78% Sales Tax 




Fourth Step 100% Sales Tax 
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Due to the progressive nature of the graduated consumption 
tax model, the rates between each step increase incrementally.  
The slowest rate increases are for more necessary items and the 
steepest rate increases are for the most luxurious items.  The 
number of tiers, steps, and rates–even the category labels–are 
illustrative only.  The actual number of tiers, steps, and rates 
must be calculated in a far less arbitrary manner.111 
Determining an item’s character, or its degree of necessity or 
luxury, obviously requires the government to make certain value 
judgments.  These value judgments must be made as objectively 
as possible.  The legitimacy of the graduated consumption tax 
model depends largely on a classification system that is 
absolutely transparent.  A transparent classification system 
would help guarantee against arbitrary assignments or political 
influence, which could discredit the system.112 
No radical solution would be required to maintain 
transparency and legitimacy; our current system of checks and 
balances can handle the challenge.  Hence, like many other 
governmental programs, under Congressional authority, the 
Executive Branch could create an independent agency like the 
“State and Federal Cooperative Tax Administration” identified 
in the Fair Tax Act,113 which would compile the various indexes, 
classification tables, and corresponding tax schedules.  The work 
 
111 Given the low mean tax rates–a consequence of the comprehensive tax 
base–the differential tax rates conceivably could cover a substantially smaller 
range than provided in the above illustration.  See infra notes 139–47 and 
accompanying text.  Moreover, a two or three-tiered system that distinguishes only 
between necessities and luxuries, for example, could achieve the same goals, while 
posing simpler tax administration issues than the six-tiered model.  In fact, similar 
models already have proven administratively possible, as most of the countries that 
employ a VAT system of taxation do so utilizing differential tax rates.  GAO, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 131 (“Most of [the] countries [using the VAT] 
had different rates for necessities and/or luxuries.”).  For the sake of clarity, 
however, the more complicated six-tiered model is offered here only for theoretical 
completeness. 
112 A weakness in the graduated consumption tax model is that businesses likely 
would mount overwhelming lobbying efforts in an attempt to influence the 
characterization of their products and, hopefully, secure a lower tax rate.  Of 
course, lobbying already affects the present tax code to some extent.  Nevertheless, 
transparency would be critical to preserving the legitimacy of the graduated 
consumption tax model.  Solutions may include prohibiting or restricting lobbying 
efforts or creating an administrative agency solely to regulate and scrutinize the 
characterization process. 
113 See H.R. 25, 109th Cong. tit. 2, § 201, ch. 4 (1st Sess. 2005). 
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conducted by that agency, or any others, would be answerable to 
all three branches of government. 
While preserving the progressiveness of the current income 
tax system, the consumption tax model reflects a different 
philosophy.  Rather than tax income progressively, which some 
may characterize as “punishing” hard work, the graduated 
consumption tax model taxes spending progressively.114  The 
objective is not to tax income or savings but to tax all 
consumption at both the production and retail levels. 
Under this policy, individuals and entities would be subject to 
the same tax rates.  The amount of taxes paid would depend 
entirely on how much the taxpayer consumes and the character 
of the items consumed.  For example, although a manufacturer’s 
consumption of raw materials would be subject to taxation, the 
level of taxation would depend on the tax classification of raw 
materials consumed.  In the case of food manufacturers, for 
instance, aside from the tax rate attached to other business 
consumption, the rate of tax that would apply either to the 
purchase of raw materials or the sale of the finished food item 
would be zero or some percentage close to it.  Similarly, in the 
case of the manufacturer of luxury items, the raw materials 
consumed would have a significantly lower tax rate than the sale 
of the final manufactured product.115 
The graduated consumption tax would apply to the purchase 
of all items, whether new or used, because the market 
automatically corrects for any discrepancies in value.116  Since 
the tax rate would be a percentage of the value, the actual 
amount of the tax would decline in proportion to the discounted 
 
114 Some might characterize the graduated consumption tax model as one that 
“punishes” spending.  Due to its progressive nature, however, it seems more 
accurate to characterize the model as one that “punishes” excessive and extravagant 
spending rather than spending in general. 
115 Characterization of the degree of “necessity” or “luxury” associated with an 
item is not measured subjectively in terms of the necessity of using any particular 
raw material for production or consumption.  Rather, “necessity” is measured 
objectively in terms of whether the item consumed, in abstraction, is something 
characteristically luxurious or necessary when compared to similar or like-kind 
materials, goods, or services. 
116 As a matter of enforcement, distinguishing between the commercial seller of 
used goods and the one-time backyard seller might prove useful, as backyard sales 
are typically hard to track.  Cf. infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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value, if any, of the used item.117  Arguably, no consumption tax 
should attach to the sale of an unmodified,118 used product 
because it has not changed character and the seller already has 
been taxed once.  Ultimately, as the next section illustrates, 
developing a sound theoretical basis for the graduated 
consumption tax is critical to its successful implementation.119 
B.  The Consumption Events Theory 
Theoretically, consumption may be considered to occur 
exclusively outside the production cycle.120  Under the traditional 
theory of consumption, if a tax on consumption were imposed at 
each step in the stream of commerce, from manufacturer to 
distributor to retailer, and if the end-market consumer were 
paying a tax on an item that represents 100 percent of the 
consumed value of the product, then the graduated consumption 
tax model would impose a total tax on consumption that would 
exceed the total consumed value of the product.  Many tax 
models, such as the VAT, operate under a version of this theory 
of consumption.121 
Viewing consumption as occurring exclusively outside the 
production cycle, however, creates an overly broad distinction 
between producers and consumers.122  Under a consumption tax 
that taxes only consumers, the assumption is that only consumers 
 
117 As a default, the character of the used item would be identical to when it was 
new.  However, merchants or backyard sellers might request character 
reevaluations by the appropriate federal agency, to compensate for age, wear-and-
tear, and similar considerations. 
118 Theoretically, the example requires the product to be unmodified because the 
character of an item must be reevaluated once modified. 
119 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
120 Some scholars note, however, that the line between consumption and 
production is not always clear.  See Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes 
and the Theory of General and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293, 316 n.65 
(2002) (“The definition of consumption, however, views individual consumption in 
isolation from the production cycle.  It suggests that an individual’s consumption 
has no productive element at all.  This implication is misleading in two respects.  
First, production and consumption are part of the same economic cycle. . . .  Second, 
it is artificial to suggest that an individual exhausts resources solely for personal 
reasons and not in any way for the purpose of production. . . .  Individual 
consumption, however, cannot be neatly separated from the production cycle.”). 
121 For an example of how this theory applies in the credit-invoice VAT context, 
see supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
122 See Feldman, supra note 120, at 316 n.65. 
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consume.  Hence, the theory infers, producers should not pay a 
consumption tax because they do not consume.  The inference, 
of course, is incorrect:  producers also consume.123  Therefore, 
the distinction should not be between producers and consumers 
as classes but between the individual events of production and 
consumption regardless of class. 
Unlike the traditional theory of consumption, which assigns 
consumption tax liability to a broad class of end-market 
consumers, the “consumption events theory” determines when 
the consumption tax should apply based on individual events.124  
The consumption events theory distinguishes only between 
production and consumption events, taxing consumption at all 
levels–whether production, distribution, or retail.  Once 
identified, each consumption event is treated as an isolated and 
complete consumption event. 
Before a manufactured product can enter into the stream of 
commerce, the manufacturer must first transform raw materials 
into something novel.  This transformative event is theoretically 
and operationally tax significant.125  Once consumed, the old 
transforms into the new, and the finished product becomes 
something separate and distinct from the raw materials used to 
create it.  The characterization of the new product is a reflection 
of that transformation.  So the tax assessed to the consumption 
 
123 See id. 
124 The “consumption events theory” is the author’s comprehensive expansion of 
Hobbesian foundational tax theory, tailored specifically to the characterization 
theories of the graduated consumption tax model.  See THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 266–67 (Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1651) (“[T]he Equality of 
Imposition consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the 
riches of the persons that consume the same.  For what reason is there, that he 
which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should 
be more charged, [than] he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; 
seeing the one hath no more protection from the Commonwealth, [than] the 
other?”).  For a discussion on the Hobbesian foundational tax theory, see Fried, 
supra note 46, at 962, 996, 1006–07, 1016.  “Under the Hobbesian view, a ‘fair tax’ is 
defined simply as a tax that applies only to personal consumption.”  Id. at 962. 
125 A bright-line transformative event test would avoid overcomplication of the 
characterization models.  Only significant changes in the physical structure or 
overall design of the good or service should qualify for recharacterization.  For 
example, if a retailer assembles a box of parts into a functioning bicycle, a 
significant change has occurred and recharacterization is appropriate.  By contrast, 
if a retailer simply inserts a reflector in the spokes of a preassembled bicycle, a 
significant change has not occurred and recharacterization is inappropriate.  For a 
brief consideration of the effect on middle merchants, see infra note 133 and 
accompanying text. 
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of raw materials under the consumption events theory 
corresponds to the complete consumption of those materials.  
Under this theory, once the new product assumes its new 
character, it then is ready for its own separate and complete 
consumption event.126 
The consumption of used items is treated no differently.  If 
the used item is modified, its character has changed, and it is 
ready for a subsequent sale that is an independent and complete 
consumption event.  The sale of the unmodified, used item, 
however, requires additional considerations under one of two 
different approaches.  The difference between the two 
approaches depends on whether the original sale is regarded as a 
complete or incomplete consumption event. 
Under the first approach, the sale of the unmodified, used 
item would generate no tax liability because its original 
consumption was considered complete.  Because the item was 
unmodified, its character did not change.  The second approach, 
conversely, views a subsequent sale as an indication that the 
item’s original consumption was incomplete.  Accordingly, the 
item would be subject to a subsequent consumption event 
because its resale would indicate some consumable value in the 
product was not exhausted by its original purchase.  Thus, the 
consumption tax on the discounted price of the unmodified, used 
item may be justified theoretically as the tax on consumption of 
that previously unrecognized value.127 
Regardless of which approach is adopted, the consumption 
events theory does not cascade tax upon tax for manufacturers 
and distributors.  By definition, cascading is not possible under 
the theory because each transaction along the chain of 
 
126 The consumption events theory is similar conceptually to the biological food 
chain.  Once an item is consumed, the theory assumes it is removed completely 
from the market, in essence, absorbed or digested by the consumer.  Although any 
product consumed subsequently may, in fact, be composed in part or entirely of the 
prior item consumed, it would be treated independently.  All items sold are viewed 
similarly under the consumption events theory, whether sold by one manufacturer 
to another for the purpose of completing an unfinished product or sold by one 
consumer to another for the purpose of selling a used item. 
127 Ultimately, the approach adopted should not have a significant impact on 
revenue generation, as the sale of the unmodified, used item would occur almost 
exclusively by the informal or “backyard” seller who, incidentally, probably does 
not claim such sales as income under the present tax system.  For the sake of 
simplicity and consistent application among all sellers, both private and commercial, 
the latter approach may be preferred. 
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production is a distinct and complete consumption event.128  
Moreover, the character of the item, and its corresponding tax 
rate, would depend on where the product is in the manufacturing 
process.129  Manufacturing profitability, therefore, would be 
preserved because the earlier a product is in the manufacturing 
process, the more its character would be assessed as necessary at 
the time of consumption.  Hence, a manufacturer consuming raw 
materials would pay little tax while the final consumer would pay 
the highest tax on that product.130 
Cascading tax upon tax may be a larger problem for the 
retailer or distributor who is simply reselling an otherwise 
finished product.131  In this situation, the business entity makes 
an inaccessible product readily available to the market.  Market 
availability would be an inherent component of the finished 
product.132  A product that is not readily available to the market 
is not in its final, market-ready form until the market readily has 
access to it.  Accordingly, the finished character of the product 
should reflect this value added by the retailer or distributor.133 
 
128 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
129 Since the character of an item would change at each step in the manufacturing 
process, the unmodified, used-item scenario would not apply to manufacturers.  See 
supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.  The consumption events theory 
assumes that tax rates may be assessed in a way that does not significantly 
encourage businesses to consolidate vertically to avoid business-to-business 
consumption tax.  In addition, this theory of consumption assumes that the final 
market is that which the public at large readily has access to, and that the tax rates 
may be assessed in a way that does not significantly encourage end-market 
consumers to prefer the purchase of unfinished products over finished products. 
130 The final, highest tax assessed on that product would depend ultimately on 
that finished product’s final character.  Moreover, this analysis ignores price 
increases along the chain of production, which would insulate further 
manufacturing profitability. 
131 Some businesses may sell services in addition to products, or services only.  
Like tangible products, services are consumable items subject to characterization 
and the corresponding tax assessment. 
132 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
133 Incidentally, middle merchants who simply pass wares already available on 
the market without also providing services may add little, if any added value.  In 
those situations, it would be difficult if not impossible for such businesses to remain 
profitable assuming that they were otherwise unable to increase the price of the 
item for sale.  Nonetheless, such middle merchants subsist presently only at the 
expense of the consumer.  Keeping prices competitive would provide previously 
exploited consumers with more money to spend on other products.  This inherent 
prophylactic consequence of the graduated consumption tax model thus may 
benefit consumers and the economy. 
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IV 
BENEFITS OF THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL 
The primary benefit of the graduated consumption tax is that 
individual taxpayers would no longer be burdened with the 
responsibility of calculating their own tax liabilities.134  
Eliminating the income tax system would also reduce the large 
drain on the economy attributed to the costs of complying with 
the April 15 filing deadline.135 
Another benefit of the graduated consumption tax system 
would be significantly greater participation from all 
consumers.136  On February 14, 2006, the IRS announced that it 
 
134 See supra notes 28, 53–59 and accompanying text.  Under the graduated 
consumption tax, the government bears the burden of calculating the appropriate 
tax rates.  Like the VAT, however, the burden of applying the appropriate rate and 
remitting taxes would fall on businesses since the two models have similar 
administrative frameworks.  See supra note 53–59 and accompanying text.  
Unfortunately, this burden is unavoidable, but businesses are better suited to bear 
this responsibility than individual taxpayers. 
 Out of concern for the potentially disproportionate burden on small businesses, 
“[m]ost European VATS were established with small business exemptions.  
Typically, in countries with these VATS, small businesses do not have to file returns 
or remit tax if their gross receipts are low, for example, less than $25,000 per year.”  
GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 130.  Exempting small businesses 
may also be a consideration for the graduated consumption tax model, but only if 
granting the exemption would not significantly affect the tax base.  See infra notes 
139–50 and accompanying text.  Like the hypothetical U.S. VAT, the treatment of 
small businesses under the graduated consumption tax model should not be a 
problem either way.  GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 136 (“For 
example . . . 96 percent of income year 1993 corporate revenues came from only 2 
percent of the corporations.  However, because most small businesses at the retail 
level in the United States are familiar with remitting state and local [retail sales 
taxes], small businesses may not need special treatment under a U.S. VAT.”). 
135 While the costs of compliance with the federal income tax are already 
exorbitant, they are only increasing.  A Tax Foundation study found that the 
estimated cost of complying with the federal income tax code in 2005 totaled over 
$265.1 billion for individuals, businesses, and nonprofits.  Moody et al., supra note 7, 
at 1.  A similar study found that “the estimated cost of [federal income tax] 
compliance in 1999 was over $125 billion.”  J. Scott Moody, The Cost of Complying 
with the U.S. Federal Income Tax, BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 35 (Tax Found., 
Wash. D.C.), Nov. 1, 2000, at 9 (Nov. 2000), available at 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/7eb3ef27926cd164a33e6bf5a46372c8.pdf.  
“Projections show that by 2015 the compliance cost will grow to $482.7 billion.”  
Moody et al., supra note 7, at 1. 
136 Of course, tax evasion is a significant concern.  Even so, participation under 
the graduated consumption tax model should exceed the current level under the 
income tax system.  See infra notes 191–203 and accompanying text. 
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estimated a $345 billion tax gap for the 2001 tax year.137  Under 
the graduated consumption tax model, taxpayers would be less 
capable of hiding from their tax burdens.  Every person and 
entity must consume to survive, and every consuming person or 
entity would pay its fair share of the taxes.138 
Because all consumption events would be taxable,139 the 
effective tax base would consist of personal consumption 
expenditures and government140 and corporate expenditures, 
including employment compensation.141  Greater taxpayer 
participation142 would allow the government to generate tax 
revenue comparable to the income tax system without 
 
137 Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates, 
IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=154496,00.html (“The updated estimate of the overall gross tax gap for Tax 
Year 2001–the difference between what taxpayers should have paid and what they 
actually paid on a timely basis–comes to $345 billion.”). 
138 Like the credit-invoice VAT, the trail of invoices found along the production 
and distribution chains would make tax liability difficult to avoid or evade under the 
graduated consumption tax model.  See infra notes 191–203 and accompanying text.  
Since everyone must pay the tax on the items they consume, foreigners or 
undocumented workers spending time and money in the United States also must 
pay consumption taxes.  Like everyone else, the amount of taxes they pay would 
correspond to the resources and governmental services they consume while in this 
country. 
139 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
140 Government spending would also be subject to tax.  This would promote 
consistency and simplicity in the application of the tax, which limits alternate routes 
for avoidance and evasion.  It also would promote government accountability.  Like 
the ordinary consumer, theoretically, forcing the government to pay taxes on its 
consumption may encourage it to spend within its means. 
141 Under the consumption events theory, employers consume the labor of their 
employees.  Accordingly, the salaries paid in exchange would be taxable to the 
employer as consumption events.  Rates would probably be low, however, as the 
consumption of most labor likely would be characterized as more necessary than 
luxurious.  Note that employers already pay taxes on payroll under Subtitle C of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  The labor tax rate schedules under a graduated 
consumption tax could be designed to impose no greater tax burden than already 
exists. 
142 Under the graduated consumption tax model, taxpayer participation includes 
undocumented workers and foreign visitors who consume resources within the 
United States.  An interesting question this Article does not address, however, is 
whether the consumption tax should be placed on items consumed in the United 
States from purchasers abroad.  For the sake of theoretical consistency, simplicity, 
and the protection against tax avoidance, the tax should apply to the consumption 
of all items consumed in the United States.  Although various trade and economic 
concerns should also be considered, a related question is whether purchases of 
products manufactured and sold outside of the United States by U.S. companies 
nevertheless should be subject to the consumption tax. 
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prohibitively increasing tax rates.  As an example, compare the 
graduated consumption tax model to the income tax system in 
2003.143 
For the 2003 tax year, the income tax system generated 
approximately $1.953 trillion in total revenue.144  The graduated 
consumption tax base in 2003 would have equaled about $17.887 
trillion.145  In order to generate the same revenue as the income 
tax, the mean tax-exclusive rate under the graduated 
consumption tax model would have had to equal about 10.6 
percent.146  Even assuming 20 percent avoidance, evasion, and 
erosion of the tax base, the mean tax-exclusive rate would 
remain relatively low at about 13.3 percent.147  By comparison, 
under the income tax system, the average tax rate for the 
individual taxpayer was also about 13 percent in 2003.148  Thus, 
unlike the national sales tax,149 the average tax rate would not 
 
143 The 2003 tax year is used as an example only because that year provides the 
most accessible data points. 
144 The figure drops to approximately $1.9 trillion after subtracting the $52.8 
billion in the revenue generated from excise taxes.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
2003 DATA BOOK 8 (2003), available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-
soi/03databk.pdf. 
145 The tax base was calculated by adding the figures for 2003 listed in the 
National Income and Products Accounts (“NIPA”) Tables, provided by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.  All of the tables relied upon for these calculations are 
available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (last 
visited June 2, 2006).  According to NIPA Table 2.4.5, line 1, personal consumption 
expenditures totaled $7.704 trillion in 2003.  Government receipts totaled $1.902 
trillion and government expenditures totaled $2.318 trillion in 2003, according to 
NIPA table 3.2, lines 36 and 39, respectively.  Consumption of fixed capital plus 
adjustments totaled $1.544 trillion in 2003, according to NIPA tables 7.5 and 7.6, 
line 1, and total compensation of employees private and public totaled $6.325 
trillion in 2003, according to NIPA table 6.2D, line 1.  Accordingly, $7.704 + $2.318 
+ $1.544 + $6.325 = $17.887 trillion. 
146 The figure was calculated in the following manner:  $1.902 trillion ÷ $17.887 
trillion = 10.6 percent. 
147 The figure was calculated in the following manner:  $17.887 x .8 = $14.310 
trillion; $1.902 trillion ÷ $14.310 trillion = 13.3 percent. 
148 Kyle Mudry & Michael Parisi, Individual Tax Rates and Shares, 2003, in SOI 
BULL., VOL. 25 NO. 3 (Internal Revenue Serv. ed., Winter 2005–06), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06winbul.pdf. 
149 Cf. supra note 77 and accompanying text.  See also William G. Gale, The 
National Retail Sales Tax:  What Would the Rate Have to Be?, 107 TAX NOTES 889, 
898–99 (2005). 
For example, if evasion occurred at the same rate in the sales tax as in the 
income tax and if the sales tax did not cover interest payments such as 
mortgages and credit card payments, 20 percent of the consumption base 
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significantly increase under the graduated consumption tax 
model.150 
The graduated consumption tax model could also significantly 
reduce enforcement costs, especially if the cost associated with 
enforcing any other sales tax is a relevant indicator.151  The 
 
would be lost.  In that case, even with no avoidance and with all other 
consumption (including health, housing, and food) fully taxed, the required 
10-year rate would rise to 39 percent tax-inclusive (65 percent tax-
exclusive).  If, in addition, state and local purchases were omitted from the 
federal sales tax, the 10-year revenue-neutral federal sales tax rate would 
rise to 45 percent tax-inclusive (82 percent tax-exclusive). 
 To replace just the personal income tax and corporate income taxes with 
a sales tax would require a tax-inclusive rate about 60 percent as large as 
the rates quoted above.  Thus, if 20 percent of the proposed consumption 
base were not taxed and state and local governments were not taxed, 
replacing the personal and corporate income taxes would require a 27 
percent tax-inclusive (36 percent tax-exclusive) rate over the next decade. 
Id. at 890. 
150 Please note the formula is not intended as a proof, but as an indication that 
the graduated consumption tax is economically plausible.  Naturally, a more 
rigorous and economically proficient review should follow.  Some scholars, for 
example, have suggested that “[a] broad, but realistic, consumption tax base . . . is 
about forty percent of gross domestic product.”  Graetz, supra note 3, at 287 n.121.  
The 40 percent figure, however, may be a more realistic tax base for the VAT.  See 
id. (noting the 40 percent figure in the context of an alternative single-rate VAT).  
Operating under the consumption events theory, the graduated consumption tax 
demands a more comprehensive consumption tax base.  See supra notes 124, 139–49 
and accompanying text. 
 Note also that the term “mean tax rate” is intended to reflect an average of all the 
various tax rates implemented during consumption over the course of the year.  
Actual tax rates would vary according to tier, step, and character.  Furthermore, 
individuals and entities concerned that they would lose the benefit of their 
deductions under the graduated consumption tax model should wait to compare 
their total tax liabilities under each system. 
151 Some experts have suggested that “while compliance with the retail sales tax is 
quite good (aside from the mail order sales problem and the growing electronic 
commerce problem), a primary reason is that current tax rates are modest, giving 
rise to only modest incentives for evasion and avoidance.”  Matthew N. Murray, 
Would Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Undermine a National Retail Sales Tax?, 50 
NAT’L TAX J. 167, 168 (1997).  Finishing the thought, attempts at evasion would rise 
in proportion to the increase in relative tax rate.  Such a prediction is plausible and 
perhaps even probable.  While the incentive for evasion under the graduated 
consumption tax model may be similar to the present income tax system, evading 
income taxes seems easier to accomplish by simply not filing income taxes.  
Logically, the number of attempted evasions would be less under a system more 
difficult to cheat.  Moreover, a similar enforcement structure accompanied with 
joint liability for both parties to a transaction along with stiff penalties, such as fines, 
liens, and prison time, seems an appropriate and significant disincentive for evasion 
to both seller and buyer alike.  Furthermore, combined taxpayer avoidance and 
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government would not have to chase and prosecute as many 
taxpayers because taxpayer avoidance and evasion should occur 
less frequently.152 
The graduated consumption tax would not shift overall tax 
liability.  The wealthy, who consume more luxurious items,153 
would continue to shoulder most of the tax burden.  Conversely, 
the poor would live a relatively tax-free lifestyle.  Those who 
would be able to afford little more than that which is necessary 
to sustain themselves or their families would pay little, if any, tax 
at all. 
The graduated consumption tax system also would make debt 
easier to avoid by attaching price tags to luxury items that would 
force taxpayers to spend within their means.  Taxpayers, 
particularly the self-employed, would no longer make errors by 
underestimating their tax liabilities when calculating their 
spending capital.  Since taxpayers would keep all their income, 
and since tax liability would be built into the price of each item, 
taxpayers would know exactly how much they can afford to 
spend.154  Thus, debt might be easier to avoid because the 
graduated consumption tax model encourages saving and 
responsible spending.155 
 
evasion should occur less than under the present income tax system.  See infra notes 
191–203 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 191–203 and accompanying text. 
153 See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
154 At least taxpayers no longer would be able to blame debt on underestimated 
income tax liability.  While debt still may be a problem under the graduated 
consumption tax model, the model would make debt easier for the responsible 
consumer to avoid.  See also infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
155 Alan Greenspan remarked that “many economists believe a consumption tax 
would be best from the perspective of promoting economic growth–particularly if 
one were designing a tax system from scratch–because a consumption tax is likely 
to encourage saving and capital formation.”  Greenspan:  Consumption Tax Could 
Help Economy, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 3, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,149298,00.html [hereinafter Greenspan].  At the very least, a consumption 
tax would not punish those who save rather than spend their money.  See Bradford, 
supra note 84, at 390 (“The most obvious way in which a consumption tax differs 
from an income tax is in the variation of burdens among people with different tastes 
or necessities to save.  In the context of the assumption that people with the same 
lifetime resources as defined above have access to the same consumption 
possibilities (‘perfect capital markets’), a consumption tax that satisfies the second 
property (no tax on savings) is neutral among equally endowed individuals.  By 
contrast, an income tax places a relatively heavy burden on those who save, or 
rather on those whose lifetime resources are paid to them relatively early and on 
those whose tastes favor later consumption.”).  Encouraging savings and 
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In addition, since the consumption tax would be factored into 
the price of every item, taxpayers would be empowered with the 
ability to choose how and when to spend their tax dollars.  This 
limited control may give taxpayers satisfaction that is not 
perceived under the present system.156  Rather than simply 
paying taxes in abstraction, each tax payment under the 
graduated consumption tax model is factored directly into the 
purchase of a good or service.  Since the graduated consumption 
tax would act like a sales tax, paying taxes would serve more 
than a purely abstract function, as taxpayers would regard taxes 
as the price of consumption. 
V 
EXAMINING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE GRADUATED 
CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL 
The graduated consumption tax raises many questions, all of 
which must be answered before such a system may be 
implemented responsibly.  Perhaps the most important question 
is whether it would be possible, as a matter of fact and theory, to 
ascribe fair value judgments as to the necessity or luxury of 
different items.  The answer depends on whether there is an 
economic model that can be implemented reliably to draw 
distinctions in inherent value. 
The character of an item may be a function of a number of 
different factors, including the basic utility of the product, the 
average market price of categorically similar items, and the 
degree of public benefit derived from the product.157  These 
factors may be weighted as variables in a mathematical equation 
formulated to derive a standardized ranking.  An item’s 
standardized rank could then be used to numerically categorize 
that item’s degree of necessity or luxury. 
For example, under the illustrative six-tiered graduated 
consumption tax model, each respective step within a tier would 
 
responsible spending, however, does not mean that the graduated consumption tax 
model would exert control over consumer spending.  See infra notes 182–87 and 
accompanying text. 
156 Although studies have indicated that taxpayers perceive little value from the 
government in exchange for their tax payments, this Article does not address how 
efficiently or effectively the government spends the taxes it collects.  See supra note 
5 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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be assigned to a range of numerical rankings.  Once the 
standardized ranking of an item is calculated, the character, tier, 
and step of that item would correspond to the appropriate range.  




Tier Degree Numerical Rank 
(Range) 
First Tier:   
Fundamental 
Necessity 
(No subdivision) 0 through 80 
First Step 81 through 207 
Second Step 208 through 472 




Fourth Step 785 through 1224 
and so on . . . 
 
Using the table,158 an item with a standardized ranking of 562 
would fall within the third step of the second tier.  Using the tax 
rates from Table 2,159 the tax on that item would equal 3 percent.  
Under this system, products would be grouped into a multitude 
of different categories that contained practically similar or nearly 
identical items.  All the items in each category would be assigned 
the same standardized rank.160 
The ability to identify the character of an item would be 
powerful.  Placing that power exclusively into the hands of the 
government could be unwise.161  Placing that power into the 
hands of an independent agency with government and public 
 
158 Once again, the table and its contents are included for illustrative purposes 
only. 
159 See supra note 110 and accompanying text and tables. 
160 Manufacturers and retailers would be required to publish the rank of each 
item on the item itself, as a label or within the product’s bar code. 
161 Many state and local governments already make these value judgments in the 
application of sales taxes, without significant objection.  For instance, many sales 
taxes exempt necessary items like certain types of food and medicine.  See, e.g., 
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6369 (West 1998) (exempting certain medicines from 
sales tax). 
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oversight, however, seems the safer bet.  The independent 
agency should consist of a nonpartisan panel of tax professionals, 
economists, and other specialists who would conduct transparent 
sessions and would be accountable to the government and the 
public.162  Government and public oversight and accountability 
would ensure that such experts would apply the appropriate 
equations to objectively calculate the right tax rates and item 
characterization.163 
A.  Administrative Concerns 
Even if item characterization is possible, government reports 
imply that the graduated consumption tax model would be 
administratively unsound.  In 1998, the General Accounting 
Office released a study in which it presented analysis on major 
tax alternatives.164  Regardless of which alternative tax 
methodology it studied, the GAO repeated one theme very 
clearly:  multiple tax rates should be avoided because they would 
 
162 Members may be appointed to the independent agency through Congressional 
committees, much like federal judicial appointments.  The transparency and 
legitimacy of the system might be preserved by creating a special tax court whereby 
taxpayers may sue to challenge the characterization of any particular item. 
163 Under this scenario, the legislation might outline a procedure like the 
following:  the independent agency would draft a tax proposal and submit it for a 
certain period of time for public review.  Through the appropriate procedures, 
likely via their own representatives, taxpayers may voice concerns or comments 
about the proposal for review by Congress.  After public hearings, Congress would 
ultimately ratify, reject, or return the proposal to the agency for revision.  If sent 
back to the agency for revision, once revised, the proposal would travel through the 
same procedure again until it finally was ratified by Congress and enacted into law. 
164 GAO, TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 55–188. 
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be more difficult to administer.165  A 1984 Treasury Report (the 
“Report”) put forth an identical sentiment.166 
Since the graduated consumption tax is structurally similar to 
the VAT or a national sales tax, it has similar administrative 
benefits.167  When considering the VAT or a national sales tax, 
however, the Report stated that “there should be only one rate 
of tax, and it should be applied to a comprehensive tax base.”168  
In support of its conclusion, the Report suggested that the 
administration of a system utilizing multiple rates would be 
“greatly complicated” and overburden retailers, such as grocery 
clerks, with the “necessity to know which rate to apply to any 
given item and the obligation to make the proper distinction as 
sales are made.”169 
Undoubtedly, the administration of multiple or differential 
tax rates would be more complicated than administering a single 
tax rate.  But the increase in complexity should not 
automatically foreclose its consideration.  In fact, dismissing 
alternative tax models that implement differential rates as 
administratively impractical is paradoxical given that the income 
 
165 For instance, when analyzing the subtraction VAT, the GAO made the 
following recommendation. 
To be administrable, a subtraction VAT should have only one rate.  
Although multiple rates add complexity to a credit VAT, with a 
subtraction VAT businesses simply could not keep track of the rates paid 
at the intermediate production stages.  If more than one rate applied, the 
net difference between sales and purchases could not be the basis for 
calculating the tax.  Further, if multiple rates were used with a subtraction 
VAT, the tax agency administering the tax would have no reliable way to 
confirm a business’ claims for the volume of goods sold at lower rates, since 
the business, itself, would furnish the audit information. 
Id. at 146. 
166 “To avoid unintended distortions in consumer behavior, a sales tax should 
constitute a uniform percentage of all consumption expenditures.”  DEPT. OF THE 
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 216 (Nov. 1984) 
[hereinafter DEPT. OF THE TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform/tres84v1All.pdf.  The Report is emphasized 
because it explains why a multiple-rate VAT would raise significant administration 
concerns. 
167 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
168 DEPT. OF THE TREASURY REPORT, supra note 166, at 217. 
169 Id. 
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tax system itself imposes differential rates.170  In addition, such a 
dismissal sends the strange message that the ordinary taxpayer is 
better equipped to handle the challenge of multiple tax rates and 
exceptions than the government agencies that administer 
taxation. 
Furthermore, the Report provides no conclusive findings that 
administration of differential rates would be prohibitive.  The 
Report instead takes the anecdotal example of the grocery store 
clerk who would be forced to know that orange juice is taxed at 
a different rate than orange soda and apply the differential tax 
rates appropriately.171  Yet, this seems no more complicated than 
knowing which price tag to attach to each product. Still, the 
Report concludes that “[d]istinctions of this type also greatly 
complicate tax administration, since it is necessary for auditors 
to verify the rates reported on various sales.”172 
While tax administration would be more challenging under a 
tax system with differential tax rates, the extent of the added 
complexity remains unknown.  For example, technological 
advances could make the administrative complexities more 
manageable than in 1984.173 
Nevertheless, the Report lists economic reasons for 
disfavoring the use of differential tax rates.  For example, the 
Report predicted that differential tax rates would “[interfere] 
with tax neutrality by distorting consumer choices away from 
highly taxed items and toward lightly taxed ones.”174  Like 
administrative complexity, the potentially paternalistic economic 
impact of the graduated consumption tax system is a legitimate 
concern. 
B.  Equity Concerns 
As a threshold matter, there is some question whether it is 
more fair to tax income or consumption.  One reason to prefer 
 
170 The exception is, of course, that the income tax places the filing onus on the 




173 In fact, administering a consumption tax at differential rates is already 
possible.  See supra notes 59, 111 and accompanying text. 
174 In addition, the Report discourages assessing higher tax rates on luxuries than 
necessities.  See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY REPORT, supra note 166, at 217. 
RAFT.FMT 2/21/2008  10:28:12 AM 
202 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 161 
taxing income progressively is to help offset disparities in wealth.  
The graduated consumption tax model operates under the policy 
that income, no matter how large, should not be taxed if the 
money does nothing or if it is spent doing nothing society deems 
“bad.”  Put another way, money used to do something society 
regards as “good” should not be penalized.  The policies of the 
income tax system implicitly agree with this reasoning, as 
evidenced by the deductions allowed for charitable giving.175 
Pushing the policy to its logical conclusion, money and wealth 
are “bad” for society only when they are used “badly.”  
Assuming this is true, it makes little sense to tax income without 
reference to how the money is actually spent.176  Accordingly, 
the graduated consumption tax operates under the policy that it 
is more fair to tax consumption than unspent income because 
taxing the former allows the rates to correspond with how the 
money is used.177 
The graduated consumption tax model also operates under 
the premise that it is fair to attach higher tax rates to more lavish 
consumption.  Admittedly, attaching higher tax rates to the 
consumption of more luxurious items may not seem equitable at 
first glance.  For instance, take the example of the modest 
consumer who saves her money by economizing on groceries so 
she can afford to purchase the luxurious item she always wanted.  
Would it be fair to impose the highest rate of tax on that 
person’s purchase? 
Before we can answer that question, we must first determine 
how to reliably test fairness in taxation.  Recent scholarship 
suggests that the most accurate way to test the inherent equity of 
a tax system is to compare the theoretical effects on similarly 
situated taxpayers.178  Or, perhaps fairness is best measured by 
 
175 See I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
176 Some may contend that money not spent is used “badly.”  However, the 
graduated consumption tax encourages savings over consumption. 
177 An income tax and a consumption tax are similar in that they both impose a 
tax on labor earnings.  See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1417–18.  Yet 
income tax applies progressive rates according to the amount of earnings, while the 
graduated consumption tax model applies progressive rates according to the use of 
earnings. 
178 Professors Bankman and Weisbach, for instance, utilize intraclass 
comparisons when discussing comparative consumption tax and income tax net 
redistribution.  Id. at 1440 (“[Under an ideal consumption tax], there is no net 
redistribution from one wage class to another.  We do find intraclass redistribution: 
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balancing the theoretical consequences of each alternative tax 
policy for the same hypothetical taxpayer.  The following 
example of the average wage-earning consumer demonstrates 
the inherent equity of the graduated consumption tax model. 
Assume the average wage-earning consumer may be taxed 
with either a progressive income tax or a progressive 
consumption tax.  Under the income tax system, the more 
money the individual makes, the higher the rate of tax the 
person pays.  But, the typical wage-earner can make more 
money only through more work, whether in the form of 
overtime, promotions, or additional or alternative employment.  
Under a consumption tax system, by comparison, an individual 
pays a higher rate of tax only when he or she chooses to 
consume a more luxurious item. 
Ultimately, equity boils down to a simple choice:  whether to 
attach higher tax rates to the choice to work more or to attach 
higher tax rates to the choice to consume more lavishly.  In both 
situations, personal liberty is at stake to some extent, whether in 
the choice of consumption or the choice of labor.179  Those 
accustomed to the income tax might resist the thought of 
attaching higher tax rates to a consumer’s decision to buy a more 
luxurious item.  But, attaching a higher rate of tax to the fruits of 
that person’s decision to work more seems equally 
inappropriate.180  The graduated consumption tax operates 
 
the burden of the $400,000-per-year wage earner who spends rises relative to the 
$400,000-per-year wage earner who saves; the burden of the $20,000-per-year wager 
[sic] earner who spends rises relative to [sic] burden of the $20,000-per-year wage 
earner who saves.”). 
Professors Bankman and Weisbach make another important point. 
[C]onsumption tax is often opposed on the grounds that, by not taxing the 
return to investment, it ignores the morally relevant difference between 
winners and losers:  investments that pay off and investments that do      
not. . . . Whatever the merits of treating winners and losers differently, they 
have no bearing on the choice between an income tax and a consumption 
tax. . . . [Because] both taxes treat returns to risk the same way . . . [i]f it is 
desirable to tax risk using graduated rates, both income and consumption 
taxes can do so. 
Id. at 1440–41. 
179 This example assumes an average wage earner who is not seriously in debt.  
Not coincidentally, consumers seriously in debt may need some incentive to 
reexamine their spending. 
180 Some scholars have concluded that the income tax distorts both work effort 
and savings while a consumption tax would distort only work effort.  See Bankman 
& Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1422–28.  If the consumption tax distorts work effort 
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under the premise that it is fair–perhaps even virtuous–to 
encourage productivity while discouraging unnecessary 
consumption.  Thus, attaching a higher tax rate onto an 
individual’s lavish consumption is more equitable than attaching 
a higher tax rate onto the sweat of that person’s brow.181 
C.  Economic Efficiency 
Some scholars have concluded that a consumption tax would 
promote economic efficiency when compared to an income 
tax.182  Yet, given the use of differential rates, a consequence of 
the graduated consumption tax model might be that it 
inadvertently encourages consumer spending trends that reflect 
the characterization determinations made by the government.  
Assigning a significantly higher tax rate on a BMW 3-series than 
on a Toyota Prius, for instance, might send a message to 
consumers that they should buy the Prius.  Although the 
graduated consumption tax model might have some influence on 
consumer spending, tax laws–like all other laws–inevitably 
reflect societal values and governmental processes.183 
 
at all, the distortion seems an indirect effect only.  See id. at 1437 (“A retail sales tax 
is not imposed when wages are earned.  Instead, sales taxes are imposed only when 
the individual purchases consumption goods, often many years after the wages are 
earned.  One might say loosely that a wage tax is ex ante while a retail sales tax is ex 
post.  In fact, most consumption taxes are largely ex post–they are imposed when 
consumption goods are purchased.”).  While the ordinary wage earner may or may 
not have to work harder to earn enough money to afford the luxury item–and pay 
the higher tax–the wage earner does not automatically subject herself to a higher 
tax rate simply because she chooses to work harder, as is the case under the income 
tax model.  Instead, the individual is subject to the higher tax rate only when that 
person chooses to consume a more luxurious item. 
181 Admittedly, the graduated consumption tax model reflects a conservationist 
attitude. 
182 Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1455 (finding that an ideal 
consumption tax “[would] generate efficiency gains”). 
183 See Leah Witcher Jackson, Won the Legal Battle, but at What Tax Cost to Your 
Client:  Tax Consequences of Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading Up to and 
After Commissioner v. Banks, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 47, 56–57 (2005) (“Through tax 
laws, Congress creates incentives for citizens to privately spend money on, or invest 
in, activities deemed beneficial to society and, therefore, in need of our private 
support.  Programs and activities that citizens and businesses support voluntarily do 
not need as much, or any, support from the government.  The federal income tax 
system also discourages various types of spending and provides punitive monetary 
measures for activities not favored in society.  Moreover, the tax laws influences the 
economy by affecting a multitude of routine and major life choices, such as the type 
of housing people live in, the manner in which they save for retirement, the 
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Perhaps more significant is whether the graduated 
consumption tax model might exaggerate class stratification.  In 
the last example, encouraging the consumer to buy the Prius 
may benefit the economy if it encourages the taxpayer to spend 
within her or his own means.  At the same time, however, 
encouraging taxpayers to spend within their means would make 
it more difficult for low-to-middle income persons to afford 
luxury items.  Class stratification, therefore, would become 
exaggerated if only the wealthy could afford items of luxury. 
By attaching higher tax rates to the consumption of more 
luxurious items, the graduated consumption tax model should 
encourage consumers to spend within their means.  A higher tax 
rate attached to the more luxurious item would be an 
appropriate cost of luxury that, by some definitions, is 
unnecessary and detrimental to social welfare.  The high tax rate 
attached to the price tag may indeed be shocking for some 
individuals, but perhaps the shock would bring some consumers 
to their senses regarding their standard of living. 
Encouraging consumers to spend within their means may 
seem paternalistic, but the influence might help the economy 
because, among other things, it could reduce debt.184  
Nevertheless, successfully reducing debt and encouraging 
consumer resourcefulness presupposes objective item 
characterization.  And, since class stratification exists already 
under the income tax system, there are causes other than tax 
rates. 
Even if the graduated consumption tax model has a net 
positive economic impact, another concern is whether tax policy 
should influence consumer spending at all.  Any influence over 
spending, even an arguably positive one, may be regarded as an 
intrusion upon the economic free will of the consumer.  After all, 
it is not the government’s place to dictate how its citizens should 
 
structure of a new business, and the arrangement of debt.  However, some of the 
special rules in the Internal Revenue Code cannot be explained or justified by the 
noble goal of influencing our behavior for the betterment of our society.  
Sometimes the explanation for a provision is the clout of a political party or the 
persuasiveness of special interest lobbies.”). 
184 The high price tags attached to luxurious items under the graduated 
consumption tax model may reduce irresponsible spending and debt in some cases, 
but it may have less impact on irresponsible spending and debt caused by the bad 
decisions and poor spending habits of the individual consumer.  See supra note 154 
and accompanying text. 
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live.185  Yet, to some extent, these concerns already exist given 
present interest rates and the income tax system.186  The 
graduated consumption tax should have no significant impact on 
responsible spending other than, perhaps, to encourage more of 
it.187 
Manufacturers, particularly those that manufacture luxury 
items, undoubtedly would oppose a shift to a graduated 
consumption tax model.  Manufacturers might argue that the 
graduated consumption tax model amounts to a disincentive to 
produce luxury goods because their high tax rate may shock an 
otherwise willing consumer away from the purchase.  In turn, the 
widespread disincentive to buy would result in a depressed 
economy. 
A shift to a graduated consumption tax may have a significant 
dampening effect on the sales of high-end luxury items, at least 
temporarily if not permanently.  Still, those concerned that the 
graduated consumption tax model might stifle economic 
prosperity must also account for the evisceration of the income 
tax system.  The absence of income tax would create sizable 
increases in disposable income that immediately would be 
perceptible because taxpayers would pocket all their 
paychecks.188  The increase in taxpayers’ take-home income 
could offset the disincentive to buy luxurious items. 
Moreover, those wealthy enough to afford luxury items should 
not be hindered by the added consumption tax, especially since 
they would no longer be paying an income tax.  In fact, the high 
tax rate would build an added element of exclusivity into the 
price of a luxury item.  Exclusivity is, essentially, the message the 
 
185 For example, consider the low-income individual who wants to save up to buy 
a luxury item.  The paternalism concern is that the consumption tax model would 
attempt to control low-income consumer spending by attaching high tax rates to the 
price tags of luxury items.  While the graduated consumption tax ultimately might 
have some paternalistic impact on spending, it is not intended to serve as a system 
of control.  To the contrary, the graduated consumption tax is designed to eliminate 
the individual taxpayer filing burden while preserving tax progressivity.  See supra 
note 14 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
188 Although this Article focuses on a federal graduated consumption tax model, 
if the model proves successful, states with an income tax system may also adopt it.  
States adding their own graduated consumption tax on top of the federal tax would 
not stifle their economies. 
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luxury conveys and what many wealthy consumers are 
purchasing.  Thus, making an item more exclusive may make the 
luxurious item even more desirable and, hence, worth the added 
cost.  By reincentivizing luxurious consumption and reducing 
debt, a graduated consumption tax model that encourages 
taxpayers to save their money and spend within their means 
could promote economic efficiency.189 
Although excellent research already has been done on the 
efficiency gains of a consumption tax over an income tax,190 
further research is necessary to better predict the extent to which 
differential tax rates under a graduated consumption tax would 
affect overall economic efficiency.  Certainly, a reliable 
prediction will depend on the actual tax rates, steps, and 
characterization models adopted for the graduated consumption 
tax. 
D.  Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
Tax avoidance and evasion may occur less frequently under 
the graduated consumption tax model.  Indeed, given the broad 
tax base, overwhelming tax participation seems unavoidable, as 
consumption is necessary for survival.191  Still, tax avoidance 
 
189 See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. 
190 See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1455 (“Supporters of an income 
tax have argued that any efficiency gains realized from switching to a consumption 
tax are overstated.  They argue that eliminating the tax on savings will require 
higher taxes on wages and that any efficiency gains from eliminating the first tax 
will be reduced or offset by the efficiency loss from increasing the latter tax. . . . We 
show that none of these arguments is correct.”). 
191 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  While evasion and efficiency 
under a comprehensive tax base may generate unresolved empirical questions, a 
comprehensive tax base “should reduce the opportunity of tax avoidance since it 
reduces differential treatment of items.”  James R. Repetti, The Uneasy Case for a 
Comprehensive Tax Base 18 (Boston Coll. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 99, 2006).  Although Professor Repetti’s paper discusses evasion and efficiency 
under a comprehensive income tax base, his conclusion that tax avoidance would be 
reduced under a comprehensive income tax base may also apply to the graduated 
consumption tax model.  See id.  Professor Repetti concludes that tax avoidance 
should be reduced because a comprehensive tax base, which allows lower marginal 
tax rates, “reduces differential treatment of items.”  Id.  Although the graduated 
consumption tax utilizes differential tax rates, differential treatment of items would 
be eliminated because all items would be subject to tax and similar items consumed 
would be subject to the same tax.  Accordingly, one could avoid the tax only if one 
did not consume.  Furthermore, since the character and resultant tax rate would be 
predetermined, there would be no opportunity to “avoid” the tax by reclassification 
except by fraud.  Fraudulent or otherwise illegal attempts to minimize or eliminate 
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would be possible.  While the graduated consumption tax model 
may encourage responsible spending and savings, the wealthy 
may be able to avoid tax liability simply by reducing their 
consumption of luxuries.  Of course, while the rich can choose to 
live poorly, it is not likely.192  Even if some wealthy consumers 
do live modestly, the graduated consumption tax model is 
premised upon the theory that an individual should be taxed 
according to how lavishly that person actually consumes and not 
on the amount of that person’s unspent income.193  So, under a 
policy to tax lavish consumption, even a wealthy person should 
enjoy the tax benefits of consuming less.194  Indeed, such 
behavior probably should be encouraged in the interests of 
conservation, especially for those individuals or entities with an 
otherwise unchecked affinity or unlimited ability to consume 
natural resources without hesitation or restriction. 
Conceivably, however, a wealthy person could consume 
excessive amounts of items characterized as necessary without 
enduring adverse tax consequences.  For example, a wealthy 
person could decide to host lavish events every night, buying 
food and drink for multitudes of people while paying a minimum 
amount of tax.  The graduated consumption tax model, however, 
anticipates such events.  While food in general may be 
characterized as “necessary,” different types of food would be 
characterized very differently.  Most likely, the wealthy host 
would offer a different character of food and drink than lower-
income taxpayers would provide for their families.  Accordingly, 
while food generally may be characterized as necessary, certain 
food items–like champagne and caviar for instance–would be 
 
tax liability are not tax avoidance, but tax evasion.  See id. at 1 n.1.  See also infra 
notes 196–203 and accompanying text. 
192 In fact, the Department of Labor reported that, in 2003, consumer units 
earning $150,000 or more “spent more for every item examined than did the less-
than-$70,000 group.”  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS, SUMMARY 06-02, COMPARING CHARACTERISTICS 
AND EXPENDITURES OF CONSUMER UNITS IN SELECTED INCOME RANGES (Jan. 
2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils54.pdf. 
193 See supra notes 114, 124 and accompanying text. 
194 Such a policy may indeed be Hobbesian.  See supra note 114 and 
accompanying text.  Regardless, a tax policy that encourages savings–or, at least, 
one that does not punish savings–should be preferred to one that discourages it.  
See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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characterized as more luxurious and taxed at significantly higher 
rates.195 
Although tax avoidance concerns may be minimal, tax evasion 
may be a more significant concern.196  Even though regulating 
sellers to ensure the proper application of the tax program seems 
like a relatively straightforward task, William G. Gale expressed 
concerns about tax evasion in his analysis of the national sales 
tax.197  While most of those concerns are particular to the 
national sales tax model,198 some could apply to the graduated 
consumption tax model. 199 
For example, Gale envisions that “[i]t will . . . prove very 
difficult to collect high-rate sales taxes from a number of small-
scale service industries–taxi cab drivers, plumbers, handy men, 
painters, maids, etc. are classic examples.”200  This problem is 
significant under the national sales tax model because the sales 
 
195 Admittedly, the wealthy host could consume excessive amounts of food 
characterized as necessary without incurring significant tax liability. 
196 Professor Repetti concludes that tax evasion is an unresolved empirical 
question under a comprehensive income tax model.  See Repetti, supra note 191, at 
17.  Although his conclusion also might apply to the graduated consumption tax 
model, his analysis must take into account that most tax evasion under the 
graduated consumption tax model would be more complicated, and perhaps more 
difficult, than simply failing to file a tax return.  For instance, tax evasion might look 
as follows:  manufacturer makes a deal with seller that seller would mislabel a 
product purchased from manufacturer in order to qualify for a lower tax rate.  
Seller would then sell the product to buyer, either at market price or at a discount 
sufficient to make a larger profit due to the lowered tax rate.  Alternatively, 
manufacturer makes a deal with seller that seller would mislabel a product 
purchased from the manufacturer in order to qualify for a lower tax rate but, 
instead of selling the product at market price, seller instead sells it at a rate that 
would produce a significant profit only upon a high volume of sales.  The latter 
scheme would allow the seller to sell an otherwise luxurious item at a lower price, 
therein undercutting the competition. 
 The exception is that businesses also could evade taxes by simply failing to report 
sales.  While periodically auditing the inventories of such businesses could help 
solve this problem for the sales of goods, the failure to report the sales of services, 
or the underreporting of such sales, could pose a challenge.  See GAO, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 47, at 143 (noting a Canadian study that reported 
“the potential for ‘skimming’ (underreporting) or nonreporting of legitimate 
business receipts with the Canadian VAT is greatest in the service sector, similar to 
the U.S. income tax”). 
197 See Gale, supra note 78, at 451–53. 
198 Exploitation of the $2000 offshore credit under the national sales tax is one 
example.  Id. at 452. 
199 See id. at 452–53. 
200 Id. at 452. 
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tax imposed would be a fixed percentage and, while the scale is 
small, the volume of sales in these industries is high.  
Accordingly, tax evasion in these situations could have a 
significant adverse affect upon revenue generation. 
Tax evasion in the high-rate sales from small-scale service 
industries may be less of a problem under the graduated 
consumption tax model.  Most of the small-scale services 
described would probably be assessed at marginal tax rates due 
to the necessary character of these services, for example, 
transportation, housing, maintenance, etc.  Under contemporary 
evasion theory, a moderate tax rate would generate only 
moderate incentives for evasion.201  Depending on the 
moderation of the assessed rate, the effect on revenue could be 
comparable to the undeclared cash wages and tips under the 
present income tax system. 
Furthermore, the graduated consumption tax would 
incorporate the same security mechanisms as the credit-invoice 
VAT.  Under the national sales tax model, by comparison, fraud 
is a more serious concern because, unlike the income tax system, 
there would be no required third-party reporting.202  Without 
third-party reporting, commerce would be under the “honor 
system” where it would be far easier to cheat.  Third-party 
reporting, however, exists under the graduated consumption tax 
model because, like the credit-invoice VAT, the authenticity of 
all transactions and the resultant tax can be verified by 
comparing the invoices of the businesses and individuals 
 
201 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
202 See Gale, supra note 78, at 452 (“More generally, the two parties to a sale will 
have incentives to report lower-than-accurate transaction prices to the government 
coupled with side payments.  The true transaction price and the side payments 
could easily be shielded via complex financing arrangements. . . . For income where 
taxes are withheld and reported to the government by a third party, the evasion rate 
is about one percent.  This is predominantly withholding of taxes on wages.  At the 
other extreme, for income where taxes are not withheld and there is no reporting, 
the evasion rate is 30 percent or more.  In contrast, the pure retail sales tax would 
be collected only from businesses that make retail sales, and there would be no 
withholding or reporting by anyone other than the business itself.  That is, the entity 
reporting the tax payment would also be the entity legally responsible for the tax 
liability.  Because the pure retail sales tax would feature no third-party withholding 
or reporting, the possibility of high rates of evasion needs to be taken quite 
seriously.”).  Of course, a system that requires more complicated mechanisms to 
successfully evade tax liability is a system that is more difficult to cheat and, 
therefore, a system where evasion would occur less.  See supra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
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involved at any point in the production, distribution, and retail 
chains.203 
A low average tax rate, combined with regular auditing along 
all levels of the stream of commerce, and the imposition of stiff 
penalties and fines against offenders, may result in decreased tax 
evasion.  Even assuming evasion rates were comparable to the 
income tax system, given the significant decrease in tax 
avoidance, the combination of revenue lost under both 
avoidance and evasion would be less than the combined 
avoidance and evasion that occurs presently. 
E.  Mortgage Interest, Investments, and Health Care 
The current income tax system provides deductions that 
encourage home ownership.204  Perhaps the most significant is 
the deduction for mortgage interest.205  Mortgage payments are 
taxable under the graduated consumption tax model.  Like 
anything else, borrowed money would be taxable once it was 
consumed.  A lender loans money to a borrower so the borrower 
can purchase an item of significant value that the borrower 
otherwise could not afford.206  The borrower uses the money 
loaned to make the large purchase.207  The borrower then repays 
the loan incrementally at a negotiated interest rate.  The total 
repayment amount, which equals the sum of the principal plus 
interest, is the borrower’s cost of purchasing the home.208  
Accordingly, the entire repayment amount would be subject to 
consumption tax.  Nevertheless, the amount of tax likely would 
be negligible for most taxpayers because home payments, 
 
203 See supra notes 52–53.  Like the credit-invoice VAT, the largest evasion 
challenge for the graduated consumption tax may be the failure to report the sales 
of services.  See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
204 I.R.C. § 163 (2006). 
205 See id. 
206 This analysis assumes a typical home owner. 
207 As collateral, the lender attaches the item as security for the loan. 
208 The lender may be ignored for consumption tax purposes because, by lending 
money, the lender technically is not consuming anything.  For this reason, lending 
institutions may favor a graduated consumption tax model.  This policy, however, 
may encourage lending institutions to loan money more generously, in turn helping 
consumers achieve certain benchmarks, such as home ownership. 
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principal and interest included, would be characterized as 
necessities in most cases.209 
Investments, such as stocks and mutual funds, would be 
subject to taxation upon the purchase of shares by the investor.  
The equity built or lost, however, would be subject to no tax 
burden or benefit.  Under the graduated consumption tax 
theory, savings and equity or income generation are not taxable; 
rather, only consumption events trigger tax liability.  Similarly, 
aside from an incidental sales tax,210 most taxpayers do not 
presently pay taxes on health care services.  Under the 
graduated consumption tax model, however, the consumption of 
services is not distinguishable from the consumption of tangible 
items.  Accordingly, health care services would also be subject to 
taxation.  Nevertheless, the amount of tax assessed on most 
health care services provided would probably be zero, or close to 
zero, because most health care services would be characterized 
as necessary.211 
F.  Inflation and Interest Rates 
Inflation may increase significantly during the transition from 
the current income tax system to the graduated consumption tax 
model.  Under the graduated consumption tax, however, 
manufacturers and sellers would no longer expend large 
amounts of money on income and payroll taxes.  Accordingly, 
since these costs would not be incorporated into the price of the 
items sold, the pretax market price of consumables might 
decrease. 
Still, adding a sometimes significant tax on top of market 
prices may generate a rise in the general level of market prices.  
 
209 Of course, this would not be the case where a taxpayer purchases a luxury 
home.  Large consumable items, like homes, may be subject to more specific 
characterization procedures.  For instance, such purchases may be characterized at 
the time of purchase.  Characterization of homes could include an examination of 
local market price averages, the size, age, and condition of the home, the existence 
of any renovations, the size of the lot, consideration of the relevant zoning laws and 
surrounding areas, number of homes already owned by the purchaser, and other 
similar factors.  Like property tax assessments, buyers and sellers could present the 
assessing agency with evidence they believe is most relevant to characterization. 
210 There are, of course, the common exemptions.  See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. 
CODE § 6369 (West 1998) (exempting certain medicines from sales tax). 
211 Some health care services, such as those within the category of cosmetic 
surgery, would be classified as luxurious and subject to a higher tax rate. 
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Initially, higher prices might scare consumers into reduced 
spending.212  During this period, consumers may be more 
selective about the products and services they purchase which, in 
turn, may force manufacturers and retailers to compete by 
providing higher quality products and services until the market 
finally adjusts to the change.  By then, however, consumer 
expectations may have reset, requiring manufacturers and 
retailers to maintain the same high level of quality and service 
beyond the transitional period. 
While inflation may increase during the transitional period, 
interest rates may nevertheless decline.  Household and business 
savings would grow, as they would no longer be taxed, allowing 
for more spending and investment.  Likewise, lending 
institutions would have more money to lend to consumers who 
may, in turn, seek to borrow more money, all of which may help 
to keep interest rates under control.  Moreover, interest rates 
may be reduced during the transitional period due to a market 
surplus of previously safeguarded capital, as the need for 
domestic and offshore tax shelters would vanish along with the 
income tax.213 
G.  Miscellaneous Considerations 
Although public tax professionals, such as those that work at 
the Internal Revenue Service, might oppose a shift to the 
graduated consumption tax model out of fear they may lose 
work, they should not worry.  The heart of the graduated 
consumption tax model is its tax indexes and rate schedules.  
These documents would itemize every general and specific 
category of consumable item, categorize it under the appropriate 
degree of necessity or luxury, and assess the appropriate 
graduated tax rate.  The indexes and schedules would need to be 
continuously updated and would require thousands of public tax 
professionals working in collaboration with other public and 
private sector experts to study, compute, recalculate, and 
implement periodic consumption tax rate indexes, schedules, 
 
212 This would end when taxpayers learn to trust the permanency of the increased 
paychecks that would accompany the evisceration of the income tax. 
213 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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and tables.  Such an endeavor actually may generate more work 
for public tax professionals.214 
Private tax professionals would also voice concerns about a 
shift to the graduated consumption tax model.  The shift would 
bring with it the obsolescence of individual income tax planning.  
However, the public benefit enjoyed by removing the individual 
taxpayer’s filing burdens and liabilities would outweigh the loss 
of the tax professional’s individual income tax planning.  In fact, 
most taxpayers need tax assistance because the system is so 
complicated and difficult to understand.215  For society as a 
whole, therefore, removing the need for tax assistance would be 
equitable given that the purpose of the assistance was to 
alleviate the burden that created it.  Furthermore, the tax 
professional’s career would not be eviscerated along with the 
income tax system.  Tax professionals may still be necessary to 
aid merchants and consumers with characterization assessments 
or reevaluation.216 
Some taxpayers might oppose the shift to a graduated 
consumption tax model on the ground that it would reduce 
taxpayer control over computing taxes owed.217  These taxpayers 
might contend that the income tax system allows for clever tax 
planning that can result in some level of tax avoidance.  The 
concern, however, is a relatively weak one because preventing 
unequal access to tax breaks or other loopholes would be a net 
social benefit that greatly outweighs the individual taxpayer’s 
benefits of tax avoidance.218 
In the end, although experts may support the implementation 
of some form of a consumption tax model, many suspect 
 
214 Much of today’s tax work is done by individual taxpayers who, unlike the 
public tax professionals, are not compensated for their work.  The graduated 
consumption tax model alleviates the individual taxpayer’s burden of computing tax 
liability by shifting that responsibility to the government.  Removing the benefit of 
the free labor would create a gap in work that public tax professionals would fill.  
Shifting the labor burden onto the government could generate more jobs for public 
tax professionals. 
215 See supra notes 7–8, 31–33 and accompanying text. 
216 See, e.g., supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
217 Ironically, some taxpayers might argue that laying the burden of tax 
calculation and filing on the taxpayer is a good thing, at least insofar as it allows for 
clever tax planning that may avoid some tax liability.  Naturally, this argument begs 
the question of whether taxpayer cleverness should play any role in determining 
(and avoiding) tax liability. 
218 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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implementation of a consumption tax model may prove 
impracticable.219  While the costs associated with transition 
should be considered, there also would be concerns about the 
fair treatment of taxpayers who relied upon the present tax 
system for long-term tax planning.220  While transition concerns 
are important, the degree of difficulty associated with transition 
is a subject of debate.221  Some scholars surmise that the 
transition problem may not be as overwhelming as originally 
anticipated.222  Regardless, transition issues probably are best 
resolved after the initial questions concerning the graduated 
consumption tax model are answered. 
VI 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE GRADUATED 
CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL 
The Constitution presents no significant obstacle for the 
graduated consumption tax.  Article I, Section 8 provides that 
“[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.  
. . .”223 Nevertheless, Congress’s plenary power to tax is subject 
 
219 Alan Greenspan had indicated that: 
[M]any economists believe that a consumption tax would be best from the 
perspective of promoting economic growth–particularly if one were 
designing a tax system from scratch–because consumption tax is likely to 
encourage savings and capital formation. . . . However, getting from the 
current tax system to a consumption tax raises a challenging set of 
transition issues. 
Greenspan, supra note 155. 
220 See infra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
221 See, e.g., Memorandum by David Burton and Dan Mastromarco, The Argus 
Group, to Laura Dale, Vice President, Dir. of Research, Am. for Fair Taxation 9 
(Mar. 16, 1998) (“If it is fair to hold people harmless against adverse changes in the 
tax law, then it is equally fair to tax people on windfall gains accruing because taxes 
they planned to pay when the made an investment have been repealed.”), available 
at http://www.fairtax.org/PDF/GaleRebuttal.pdf (last visited June 2, 2006). 
222 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1438 (“[I]t is quite a 
different thing to believe that an income tax is desirable than to believe that a 
consumption tax is desirable but hindered by a serious transition problem.  
Research agendas would shift from determining how to perfect the income tax to 
how to transition out of it.”). 
223 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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to two important limitations.224  First, the tax must be applied 
uniformly throughout the states.225  Second, direct taxes must be 
apportioned.226  These limitations are mutually exclusive.227 
A sales tax is “a classic indirect tax” because it does not tax 
individuals but rather the goods or services they decide to buy.228  
Accordingly, a traditional sales tax is not subject to the 
apportionment limitation229 and is constitutional when applied 
uniformly throughout the states.230  Since imposing a national 
sales tax would be constitutional, imposing a graduated 
consumption tax likewise would be constitutional so long as it is 
applied uniformly.231  Moreover, since the graduated 
consumption tax is not a tax on income, it would not implicate 
the Sixteenth Amendment.232  Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment 
may be repealed upon implementation of the graduated 
consumption tax. 
Although the graduated consumption tax may be 
constitutional itself, some constitutional questions might arise 
during the transition to its implementation.233  Specifically, 
 
224 Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”:  Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2340 (1997). 
225 Id. (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83–106 (1900)). 
226 Id. at 2340–41 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2). 
227 Id. at 2341 (quoting Nelson Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1195 n.5 (1984)) (“The Court has generally assumed that once a 
tax is found to be outside the reach of the apportionment clause, it is within the 
reach of the uniformity clause.”). 
228 Jensen, supra note 224, at 2405. 
229 See id. at 2341, 2405. 
230 Id. at 2405–06 (“As long as a value-added tax (or other form of national sales 
tax) is uniform in its application, it should survive constitutional scrutiny. . . . 
[Because they are both] classic indirect tax–like duties, imposts, and excises–and 
the founders thought that taxes on articles of consumption presented no 
constitutional problems.”). 
231 Id. 
232 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
233 See Jensen, supra note 224, at 2406 (“There are two minor areas of 
uncertainty in this analysis; neither should change the result.  One difficulty is that a 
consumption tax might be characterized, in some circumstances, as a tax on the 
ownership of property–for example, if the consumption is attributable to the 
income from real estate. . . . Of perhaps greater potential significance are the 
problems that would arise from a transition to a consumption tax. . . . The most 
commonly noted issue associated with the move to a consumption tax is how ‘old 
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transitional relief might be required to avoid double taxation of 
“old capital.”234  Such relief could amount to a direct tax, which 
would raise different constitutional considerations.235  
Ultimately, the implications of granting potential transitional 
relief should not adversely affect the overall constitutionality of 
implementing the graduated consumption tax.236 
 
CONCLUSION 
Nothing in this world is perfect.  Pointing out the problems of 
the income tax system is easy.  The solution is not to find the 
perfect system, but to imagine a better one.  And while 
imagining a graduated consumption tax model may be exciting, 
the model must not unravel when confronted by reality. 
The foundation of the graduated consumption tax system 
would depend on the creation of an objective, precise, and 
transparent characterization model.  The characterization model, 
however, is incomplete without an equally competent economic 
model to assess appropriate tax rates.  The model and its theory 
also must be tested to ensure reasonable administration as well 
as fair and practical application among taxpayers.  And even if 
this is accomplished, a transitional plan must be engineered and 
executed. 
Assuming the dream outlives this journey, this proposal’s 
transition to reality also would demand the courage and 
conviction necessary to overcome fear and political inertia.  But, 
if the graduated consumption tax model proves workable, it 
seems foolish not to consider implementing it.  Even so, “[a] 
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by 
little statesman and philosophers and divines.”237  The graduated 
 
capital’ should be treated–capital that was accumulated on an after-tax basis under 
the current tax regime but the consumption from which would be taxed under a 
consumption-tax regime as well.  Without transition relief, something like double 
taxation of the old capital could occur.”). 
234 Id.  Some scholars, however, suggest that “taxation of retiree consumption 
might produce efficiency gains that could be used to fund lower overall rates for 
everyone.”  Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 99, at 1438. 
235 Id.  Such considerations are beyond the scope of this introductory Article. 
236 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
237 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE (1841), reprinted in 1 
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE:  COLONIAL THROUGH ROMANTIC 871 
(George McMichael et al. eds., 7th ed., Prentice Hall 2000) (1974). 
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consumption tax’s fate may be predetermined by those too 
invested or too afraid to give it a chance.  Perhaps appropriately, 
a foolish consistency is something only imagination and faith can 
overcome. 
 
